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 Investigation of past incidents always reveal deficiencies that are not directly 
equipment-related, but may be non-technical in nature, such as procedural deviation, 
inadequate communication etc. Past risk assessment models only provide semi-
quantitative approaches to incorporate such learning from past incidents and cannot 
capture their dynamic nature and dependency within a single model. Current research 
takes up the challenge of developing a novel approach and step-by-step methodology for 
quantitatively merging technical, operational, human and organizational factors 
contributing to the cumulative risk of barrier failure. It also addresses their dynamic 
changes with time, considers interactions among each other and incorporates uncertainty 
of parameter estimation to assess the total risk. 
First, a methodology is developed and implemented for extracting statistical data 
of contributing factors behind past incidents from investigation reports. The study 
produces a generic dataset of contributing factors in 137 fire incidents from the US 
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). Analysis shows that failures rates of contributors are 
non-constant and can be modelled as non-homogenous Poisson process with Power Law 
distribution. Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis is utilized to predict probability of failure 
within a time period and next time of occurrence from the generic data.  Results show 
reliability growth for contributors related to ‘design flaw’ and ‘inadequate job safety 
analysis’ in the OCS, although a majority of other contributors show deterioration. In the 




specific understanding of how and when their next critical failure may occur. Interaction 
among contributing factors are measured from the analysis of investigation reports. 
Finally, a cumulative risk assessment model for an offshore unit with safety instruments 
is developed, where the contributing factors are mapped onto Bayesian Network to 
provide probability distributions of barrier failure and subsequent incidents. A case study 
is adopted to show how extracted information from investigations can be utilized to 
update generic data and obtain probability distributions of individual barrier failure. This 
research will aid management to identify key organizational issues that contribute to an 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1. Background 
It is well accepted that a good understanding of risk is essential for day-to-day 
safer operations of a chemical process facility. Safer operations with minimal risks 
ensure continued production, profitability, and survival in a competitive market without 
unforeseen mishaps [1] . Concatenation of multiple factors that have deviated from their 
safe state may lead to unsafe situations, and in worst case, cause disastrous incidents.  
The Texas City Refinery incident that occurred in 2005 [2] or the Deepwater 
Horizon incident in 2011 [3] brings a gloomy throwback at how small deviations added 
up to a disastrous event. In both cases, as in others, such deviations have been existing 
within their system for some time preceding the incident, but had not imposed an 
immediate threat, or their threat may not have been noted on time. Due to the insufficient 
measures to recognize these deviations and prevent the propagation of mishaps, these 
incidents could not be prevented.  
Although many measures are taken post-incident and many amendments 
suggested, it is the sad truth that incidents still keep happening. For example, following 
the Deepwater Horizon incident in 2011, modifications to regulations and regulatory 
bodies were put in place [4]. However, according to the public information released by 
the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), in the fiscal year 2016 
(October 1, 2015- September 30, 2016) alone, 473 incidents of various types, causing 2 




facilities in the US Outer Continental Shelf [5]. In fiscal year 2017, a total of 429 
incidents, including fires, explosions, collisions, gas releases etc. were reported in the 
US Outer Continental Shelf alone. The same source shows that from 2011 to 2016 (fiscal 
year) 13 people have died and 997 were injured through various mishaps. This signifies 
that incidents continue to happen and that our understanding of risk and requirement of 
taking appropriate modifications to reduce that risk are still not sufficient. 
 
1.2. Motivation 
Although deviation of multiple factors may suffice frequently, only in rare cases 
will these deviations arise and interact in a manner that will create a possible trajectory 
for an incident [6]. The risk arising from a single deviation of equipment, person or 
operation from a defined safe state of a small system is usually understood. But with 
large numbers of deviations existing throughout a plant, it is essential to understand how 
their holistic effect is changing the overall risk of the facility. This ‘cumulative risk’ may 
have a variety of origins such as maintenance backlog, supply delays, aging assets, 
deviation from technical standard and questionable competency of operators [7].  
Quantification of risk is essential to compare and evaluate alternate options 
available for risk reduction [8]. Quantitative risk assessments (QRAs) provide a 
magnitude of the risk showing us whether it is within an acceptable range and allows us 
to trace back to the causes that led to such high-risk values. This further enables work 
prioritization through pinpoint determination of where, when and what mitigative 




In the industry, preventive and mitigative measures are taken against the 
possibility of incidents by putting barriers in place to prevent the propagation of such 
incidents to catastrophic consequences. The interrelation between deviations such as that 
arising between unsafe acts by frontline operators and latent conditions that can lead to 
an incident was graphically modeled by James Reason in 1990 through the Swiss Cheese 
Model [6]. The Defense in Depth approach in the nuclear industry pioneered the concept 
of barriers and Reason modified it. Each slice of cheese was seen as a barrier that broke 
the incident trajectory. Eventually factors that influenced barrier failures were studied 
and extended to provide a better visual understanding of what caused a system to fail via 
use of methods such as fault trees, event trees and bowties. [6, 9-12]. In the industry, the 
concept of using barriers to prevent incidents, and maintaining barriers in proper 
condition to ensure safe operation is a well-accepted approach towards process safety. 
However, as the factors that influence a barrier evolve with time, the system behaves 
dynamically. Conventional fault trees and event trees etc. consider only static 
relationships between factors and do not explicitly consider the effect of time or changes 
made to the process variables [1, 13]. Systems dynamics will also require consideration 
of the interdependence of each factor since changes made to one will, with time, impact 
another. An attempt to consider the dynamicity and interaction of barriers and their 
influencing factors for risk assessment makes it a challenging task. 
Performance of barriers are influenced by a variety of factors which change with 
time and some of which show interdependency on each other.  It is realized that 




human or organizational in nature. Environmental or external factors can add to the 
challenge as well. Traditionally, risk assessment methods had focused only on the 
technical aspects of a system mainly because of the ease of a quantitative representation 
of their failure. However, over the last few decades, with realization sprouting mainly 
from numerous catastrophic incidents, there has been a growing effort to incorporate 
‘non-technical’ factors, namely human and organizational factors (HOF) into the 
traditional risk assessment methods. Even so, a large gap exists in merging the more 
abstract HOF with the more quantifiable technical factors of a system [1]. A study 
reported by Skogdalen et al. showed that of the 15 offshore installations considered in 
his study, the majority conducted QRAs with “HOF Explained” and considered HOF 
only to some extent and not separately [14]. None of them fell in the category “HOF 
explained, models adjusted and included in the overall risk management” where HOF 
were given as much importance as the technical factors and formed an integral part of 
the overall risk management system. The biggest challenge in getting a holistic look into 
risk is consideration of all factors together: technical, operational, human and 
organizational. 
To understand the dynamic nature of risk, it is essential to ensure that the risk 
assessment conducted uses data that is specific to the plant and is always current. Usual 
practices in risk assessment include utilization of generic data based mostly on historical 
failure rates of equipment and includes all causes of failure, thus representing industry 
averages [15, 16]. However, service condition of each plant may be different, and how 




may have an influence on failure rates too.  Also, data sample size may not be sufficient 
for a good estimation and the definition of failure may be different from that being used 
in the risk assessment. To make the data plant specific, efforts have been made to utilize 
expert opinion to update the generic values. But gathering expert opinions for all 
technical and managerial issues of a facility it is a tedious process and variation of 
opinions may lead to over or under estimation if the number of experts is not large. This 
approach has been subject to much scrutiny in this regard [17]. It has therefore become 
essential to use information obtained from various databases of a plant to update the 
generic values for better risk estimation.   
Since the effect of most deviations are not known deterministically, and the data 
used for risk assessment itself has questionable precision, a proper risk assessment 
should consider the uncertainty in the results.  This makes cumulative risk assessment 
even more complicated.  
Operation in offshore oil and gas facilities impose a particular challenge to 
process safety issues because of multiple reasons. The potential for large blowouts and 
the handling of highly flammable hydrocarbon which can lead to fires, explosions and 
fatalities are a constant threat to these systems. The dynamicity of operation, especially 
during drilling and simops (simultaneous operations) can add to the threat. The offshore 
environment itself imposes a challenge to organizational and human factors as does the 
limitation of space and time. Assessment of dynamic risk for such cases are still in the 




It is with the motivation of overcoming these challenges that the current research 
focuses on developing a framework and model for cumulative risk assessment to analyze 
increased risk due to impaired barriers in offshore facilities. 
 
1.3. Defining Cumulative Risk 
Cumulative risk assessment involves achieving an updated information about the 
dynamic risk through merging of technical, operations, human and organizational 
deviations existing within a facility. Data used for risk assessment should be specific to 
the facility and current in time. This gives several points to consider: 
a. The influence of time and process dynamics cannot be ignored if we are to 
consider deviations [18]. The dynamicity of the plant refers to the various factors 
that evolve or change with time and includes operational and organizational 
changes that may occur due to say changes made in the maintenance program, or 
changes made due to management decisions. These temporal aspects capture the 
ever-evolving nature of the plant and its management system with time.  
b. Merging of factors that are quantitative in nature (such as technical factors 
including reliability of equipment) with factors that are abstract in nature and 
cannot be readily quantified (such as organizational factors including 
effectiveness of training programs) [1]. These abstract factors can influence the 
failure function of the quantifiable ones and hence must be considered. 
c. Dependencies of the different technical, operational, human and organizational 




standby pump may only need to operate if the primary pump fails. Whether the 
standby pump fails to operate will be known when the primary pump fails and 
thus, its operation depends on the initial failure of the primary pump. 
d. Failure data may come from the equipment manufacturer who tested it, or from 
databases that provide industry average values (generic data) or, experts’ opinion 
in many cases (especially for non-technical factors). As management system 
varies from company to company, so does equipment installation, design, 
engineering practices, inspection and maintenance programs etc. over the lifetime 
of the plant. So, the conditions in which equipment is exposed to may vary 
significantly from the data. This makes use of generic data, or even the 
manufacturer provided data, misleading when it comes to risk analysis. Data used 
for risk assessment should be plant specific and up-to-date. 
e. Usually point value estimates are used when quantifying risk, whereas the 
influences of environment and other issues may give rise to variations. A failure 
parameter may be distributed over a range of values and a proper understanding 
of risk would require consideration of its distribution rather than a single value. 
Thus, uncertainties involved in parameter estimations should be considered. 
 
An assessment of risk that considers the above factors will lead to an 
understanding of the cumulative risk spawning from a plant’s operation. It is the purpose 





1.4. Problem statement 
To gain a better insight of cumulative risk, it is required to develop a model that 
meets the following challenges [1]: 
1. Considers how systems change with time, i.e. the dynamic aspect of the various 
factors 
2. Merges technical, operational, human and organizational factors affecting risk in 
one framework 
3. Considers dependency of the factors 
4. Keeps data up-to-date and plant-specific 
5. Considers uncertainties in parameter estimation 
Current research focuses on developing a model for cumulative risk assessment that 







2. PREVIOUS WORK 
 
2.1. History of Risk Assessment 
Assessing risk to compare which option is more (or less) beneficial, or safer, or 
more profitable or just better has been practiced within the human mind from the very 
beginning of time. Assessing risk in a formal way requires study of chances or 
probabilities. The modern concept of risk has been traced as far back as 3200 B.C. when 
the members of the Asipu group in the Tigris-Euphrates valley used best available ‘data’ 
(seen as signs from gods) to analyze alternatives and provide a decision based on their 
understanding of the ‘data’ [19]. However, it was not till the Renaissance period (1300-
1600 A.D) that an extensive study of risk began. [20].  
As Bernstein narrates in his book ‘Against the gods- The remarkable story of 
risk’, in around 1654, a French nobleman Chevalier de Méré, with a keen interest in 
gambling, challenged the famed French mathematician Blaise Pascal to an aged old 
problem of dividing the stakes of an unfinished game between two players based on who 
was ahead in the game. The search for a solution laid foundation of the modern day 
theory of probability [20].  
The probability theory soon found application beyond settling gambling stakes. 
By the seventeenth century, it was being used for determining life expectancies for the 
sale of life annuities and soon the business of marine insurance became a ‘hot cake’ in 
London. Around the same time, Jacob Bernoulli’s work on the Law of Large Numbers 




developed the statistical methods associated with probabilities and showed how decision 
can be made based on information about choices [20, 22], paving way for development 
in understanding risk and the principles of investment management.  
Later in the century, Thomas Bayes developed the Bayes’s Theorem that allowed 
the understanding of the probabilities of an event to be modified based on information as 
it became available. Most modern-day risk assessment and management decisions had 
their foundations laid during this period, starting from the challenge thrown by Chevalier 
de Méré.  
In current day, the theory of probability and methods for informed decision-
making finds application not only in Wall Street, but also in the core of measures taken 
for productive and safe operation of chemical and manufacturing industries around the 
globe. 
 
2.1.1. The Chauncey Starr papers and the start of a new discipline 
As the understanding of the theory of probability grew, it found application in 
multiple fields such as the medical industry, insurance companies, election polling etc. It 
became more demanding to understand the risks of taking decisions in terms of the 
impact the decisions will have. It was Chauncey Starr who, in 1969, suggested that the 
society’s perception of risk was skewed and was probably the first to bring out the need 
to quantitatively evaluate risk to understand the impact of new technology on society 
[23, 24].  He noted that as technological developments are made at increasingly faster 




totally absorbed into systems of the society itself. This makes understanding the benefit 
of the new technology and the cost it may have on the society due to its side effects even 
more difficult. He provided quantitative correlations to compare the physical risk of an 
activity to the social benefit derived from that activity and also showed how 
advertisement could impact risk awareness. Amongst other things, he suggested that 
people would take voluntary risks a thousand times more willingly than involuntary 
ones. In later work, Starr brought out the need for risk management, assessment and 
acceptability, suggesting the famous example of how people were willing to take the risk 
and come to the zoo to see a tiger if the management did a good job of keeping the 
animal locked properly inside the cage. It revolutionized the idea that there will always 
be hazards and placement of proper constraints can mitigate the risk arising from those 
hazards. 
The concept of organizational influences on failure rates have been discussed 
much in literature. Amburgey et al. in Resetting the clock: The dynamics of 
organizational change and failure talked about the dynamic aspect of organizational 
failure and change, stating that the immediate effect of organizational change is an 
increase in the hazard of the system’s failure and an increase in the likelihood of similar 
additional changes  [25]. The data for the study was collected from more than a thousand 
Finnis newspaper organizations over a period of 193 years. If extrapolated in the context 
of a chemical facility, this work showed that external and internal influences leading to 




increasing the chances of failure. This failure can be failure in the market (as with the 
newspapers studied), or failure in production or safe operation. 
 
2.1.2. Risk assessments and the high hazard industries 
As technology progressed and the process industries grew larger and more 
complex, so did the consequences that arose from incidents in these industries. Highly 
hazardous industries were being developed, such as the nuclear industries and certain 
chemical plants with potential for large impact on surroundings in case of an incident. 
Assessing risk at this point was challenging, not only because of the size of the systems 
(the facilities) but also because of the complex interaction that each element of the 
system had with each other.  
Towards the middle of the last century, experts were probing into the field of 
accident causation, trying to identify contributors to risk and suggesting multiple 
accident causation models to character how and why accidents occurred. Heinrich, 
Reason, Rasmussen are famous names in this field [6, 26, 27].   
A systematic approach to quantitative probabilistic risk assessment is rather new 
[28]. It began in the aerospace sector following the 1967 Apollo test flight disaster that 
led to fatality of three astronauts [29]. Methods to assess risk of a major event from the 
failure probability of various equipment was developed. The ideas and principles 
developed during this time forms a basis for current day risk assessment and risk 
management [28]. Much modification has been brought about. The 1979 Three Mile 




Living with High-Risk Technologies’ which now suggested that instead of looking only 
at the technical factors, it was time to focus on organizational issues that were 
influencing risk [30].  
Most of the models developed during this time used the notion of linear causality 
to assess how incidents occurred. But Perrow argued that current day systems were 
complex and tightly coupled and multiple failures can interact with each other, causing a 
major incident [30]. Technology was not the problem in such cases, but organization and 
management factors were. This idea revolutionized how risk was assessed and further 
propagated the development of methods of risk assessment whereby human and 
organizational factors were being considered. 
 
2.2. Approaches to Assess Overall Risk 
Over time, many frameworks and models have been proposed to assess risk 
arising from various conditions existing in a facility[31]. As part of the study, an 
extensive and in-depth literature review was conducted to gain an understanding of the 
pros and cons of each approach [32].  
It was found that there are two approaches applied in the industry for risk 
assessment purposes. One is based on causal chain and event modeling methods in 
which a system is decomposed for analysis and the components (machine, human, and 
organization) undergo linear interaction and follow a sequence of failure that leads to an 
incident. Numerous risk assessment methods have been developed based on this 




systems approach which analyzes the outcome of a system as emergent where the whole 
is larger than the sum of the individual parts. Non-linear interaction and self-
organization with evolving dynamics are well handled by this approach [34, 35].  
Based on each broad category, a large number of models have been developed 
over time [31, 33], of which only a few well-known ones are discussed below to provide 
a general idea about how models in each approach work. [31] 
 
2.2.1. Causal Chain and Event Modeling Approaches  
2.2.1.1. Cause and Event Chain Trees 
Fault trees, event trees, and bow-ties have long been used in the industry for risk 
assessment purposes. These cause and effect models describe linear propagation of 
failure through the system. Although the conventional ones can provide simple, 
quantitative and graphical representation of the failure states of a system whereby the 
effect of multiple deviations can be observed, they find limited application for dynamic 
systems with dependent or common cause failures. Many approaches to modification of 
these methods have been published in literature in an attempt to provide a more realistic 
model [13, 36] . These include development of sequential gates that allows dependent 
events to be modeled [37]. Recent literature shows an increased trend in the application 
of tools such as Bayesian Network and Petri Nets (discussed later) that model fault trees, 






2.2.1.2. Hybrid Causal Logic 
An extended approach of event cause trees mentioned before has led to the 
development of the hybrid causal logic (HCL), which provides a framework for 
attaching Bayesian belief network (BBN) to feed information to connected fault trees 
and event trees and vice versa [45, 46]. Fault trees allow tackling of technical factors 
while the connection of BBN allows for incorporation of risk influencing factors (RIF), 
which bring in the human and organizational aspects of the system. The method is 
simplified by utilization of expert judgment to express causal relationship between the 
RIFs. This allows development of a model that allows basic event probabilities of a fault 
tree to be updated through the RIFs and gives a graphical representation of 
dependencies.  Methods such as the HCL are resource intensive and the dependence on 
opinions of experts can bring variation and uncertainty in the risk evaluation. A similar 
approach was used in developing the Risk_OMT project which brought in human 
activities and their contribution to the risk [12, 47]. Both approaches are modifications of 
the Barrier and Operational Risk Analysis (BORA) model [48].  
 
2.2.1.3. I-Risk 
The integrated risk (I-Risk) analysis methodology contains three main 
components: the technical model, the management model, and their interface [49]. The 
technical model is developed based on Master Logic Diagrams to identify immediate 
causes of failure followed by the development of event tree and/or a fault tree in order to 




covers functions such as operations and maintenance is quantified based on audits/expert 
opinion.  At the interface, guidance is provided to assign weightage on how the 
management model will fit with the technical model to make the technical factors plant 
specific. I-Risk qualitatively as well as quantitatively enables the managerial aspects to 
be incorporated with the technical ones, but the need for having an audit team to be able 
to identify management tasks and quantify them is a large challenge. Consequently, 
frequent updating of the risk assessment may not be possible.   
There are numerous other methods that have been developed based on cause-
effect approaches with slight changes made depending on application [35, 50]. But all in 
all, they more or less follow an approach similar to any of the ones mentioned above.  
An overall look into the limitations of cause and effect models shows their inability to 
capture differences in risk when there is a variation in the success and failure events or 
variations in event timing whereby scenarios can change [13]. Variations in parameters 
that are not explicitly modeled are not considered in the risk, which can have a profound 
effect whenever the system is changed/ modified. The dynamicity of the plant is not 
completely considered. However, these approaches do help provide a simplified look at 
a complex problem and thus finds larger application in the real world [46]. 
 
2.2.2. Systems Approaches 
2.2.2.1. Accimap 
Rasmussen and Svedung were the first to draw a safety control structure within a 




events showing failures to result from contributions across six nested levels of decision-
making (Government, Regulators, Company, Management, Staff and Work) [27, 51, 52]. 
They pointed out that risk management is a control task and proper co-ordination and 
bidirectional flow of information is needed between all levels of the socio-technical 
system. Instead of analyzing risk only horizontally at the bottom levels, this procedure 
enabled a look at the higher levels in the system to identify their contribution and draw 
logical causal diagram to show their influence on the risk. This revealed the remote 
causes coming from higher levels in the hierarchy and disseminated complete attention 
given to frontline operation. In that context, the whole look into risk was obtained.  
Accimap has been used to analyze different kinds of incidents in several domains and 
provides a systematic approach to identify gaps in a system, be it technical or HOF 
related. However, it requires sufficient data and analyst skill, the map itself can become 
complicated for a simple system and it does not provide any direct information about 
what measures need to be taken or what barriers need to be placed to prevent and/or 
mitigate the risk [53]. 
 
2.2.2.2. System Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes (STAMP) 
With modification of Rasmussen’s approaches, System Theoretic Accident 
Modeling and Processes (STAMP) is based on three basic components: safety 
constraints, hierarchical control levels and process models with control loops [54-56]. 
Leveson emphasizes that complex systems are dynamic and incidents result not from 




constraints. STAMP views the system as having hierarchical levels of control and 
constraints indicating that each level in the system contributes to the system’s safety or 
to incidents. Loops are generated when each level enforces safety constraints to a lower 
level while feedback regarding proper/improper implementation of these constraints are 
fed bottom up to ensure proper placement of the enforced constraints. Thus, feedback 
and control operations replace the traditional chain of events model. Inadequate safety 
controls can arise from deficiency or absence of constraints, improper or inadequate 
execution of control actions at lower levels, and inadequate or missing feedback 
communication within the various levels of the system. Based on STAMP, the System 
Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) enables identification of a system’s weaknesses via a 
list of guided questions which then enables determination of component flaws in the 
control loop could cause such a flaw from which appropriate preventive measures can be 
identified [57]. The method can be used at any stage of the process life cycle to identify 
and repair system degradation. 
STAMP can model dynamic systems which may migrate to a state of increased 
risk over time due to external disturbances, component failure or dysfunctional 
interaction of components. It especially focuses on human and organizational 
subsystems. Although it has been applied in a variety of domains, quantification has not 
yet been possible. Identification of all loops in the system is an enormous task and 






2.2.2.3. Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) 
While STAMP is based on a specific causal model (a feedback control system), 
Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) is based on the specific theory of 
functional resonance [58]. FRAM provides a socio-technical approach with principles of 
resilience engineering to look at the safe state of a system when it is subjected to 
dynamic operational conditions. Hollnagel explains four principles on which FRAM 
stands: 1. Outcomes of a process can be different (failure or success) but the underlying 
processes are not: the reason why some operations fail are the same reason why they 
succeed; 2. Human and organizations make approximate adjustments to meet existing 
conditions and their performances can vary which may lead to failure or success; 3. 
Combinations of variations can have nonlinear effects and the system’s outcomes are 
emergent and not resultant; and 4. Consequences of such variations can be exemplified 
via tight couplings or functional resonance which cannot be understood simply through 
cause and effect analysis [59, 60]. FRAM decomposes a system’s functions into modules 
characterized by six parameters: inputs, resource, controls, time, precondition, and 
output.  
FRAM provides a step-by-step guide by identifying system functions, assessing 
and evaluating the potential variability of the functions, identifying the possible way the 
variability of one function can affect other functions and spread through the system 
(functional resonance) and finally identify countermeasures that will enable the system 
to maintain a safe state. FRAM focuses on the likelihood of functional variability instead 




2.2.3. Summary of learnings from literature 
Table 1 shows a comparison of the various models according to the two 
approaches discussed above [32].  
Table 1. Various approaches are compared based on their prospect for use in 
cumulative risk assessment (presented at the AIChE Spring Meeting and Global 































Yes  No Partially Yes 
Accimap Systems No Yes Yes N/A 
STAMP/ 
STPA 
Systems No Yes Yes N/A 
FRAM Systems No Yes Yes N/A 
 
The very nature of cause and event chain models limits projection of non-linear 




components within the system and this prevents prediction of unexpected emergent 
phenomena. At the same time complex systems are subject to change and transforms 
itself to adapt to the changes with time, which makes such systems dynamic [13]. 
Organization and human factors give rise to numerous non-linear cause-effect 
relationships and their quantification is difficult, with heavy reliance on scoring 
methods. This brings large uncertainty and ambiguity into the model [11, 12].  
Identification of all relations are also difficult. All these issues challenge the cause and 
event chain approach. Yet their simplicity and ability to easily represent a system has 
made them widely applied in chemical industries today [61]. Utilization of Bayesian 
network allows dependencies to be considered to a certain extent. Several modifications 
to incorporate dynamic aspects of risk with consideration of non-technical factors is 
discussed later. 
On the other hand, attempting a systems approach brings about a different kind 
of limitation. These models require extensive resources and demand deep understanding 
of the system. This approach tends to identify all links within a large hierarchical 
system, both horizontally as well as vertically, to understand how factors may evolve 
with time and affect other. Though this allows understanding the dynamicity of the 
system, it is indeed a daunting task to complete, and is more doable once an incident 
occurs (when the inter relation of factors become known) rather than for developing a 
predictive model. As the system evolves with time, updating it may become difficult and 




capture the emergent property, it is still in the theoretical phase and quantification is not 
available.  This approach is yet to find acceptance for large-scale usage in the industry. 
From the above analysis, it seems apparent that using the cause and event chain 
modeling approach and modifying it to adjust to the requirements for a quantified 
cumulative risk assessment would be a more attainable goal with greater applicability 
than a systems approach. Emergence property as described by systems approach is yet to 
be properly defined, and provisions developed to understand if the complete emergence 
effect of all factors has been incorporated in the model. The cause and event chain 
approaches require modification to include a feedback method of system changes and 
incorporate the effect of passage of time to capture the dynamicity of a system. 
Henceforth, the work is developed using a barrier analysis brought about by the cause 
and event chain modeling approach. 
 
2.3. Tools for Cumulative Risk Assessment 
2.3.1. Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault Tree (FT) analysis is a deductive (top-down) method that uses Boolean 
logic to break a system into multiple base events that are connected via AND and OR 
gates to lead to the top undesirable event. FT can also be analyzed using minimal cut 
sets. In context of this paper, FT appear helpful in that they allow combination of 
different deviations for obtaining their overall effect in the top event. It is easy to use and 
provides a quick understanding of how various factors are affecting the top event. 




inability to show multiple top events together. It is also limited in its ability to handle 
complex systems where dependency or common cause failures need to be addressed. In 
dynamic systems, where sequential failure needs to be considered, the static fault tree 
(SFT) is incapable of providing a complete system representation. As an extension to the 
SFT, dynamic fault tree (DFT) allows usage of functional gates such as sequence 
enforcing gates (SEQ) that overcome such limitations [36]. DFT needs to be converted 
to Markov Chain model for analysis and this becomes difficult for large system 
particularly because of the tendency of state space explosion due to the countless states 
that can be reached in a large Markovian system at a given time. The method is also 
prone to errors [41].  
 
2.3.2. Event Tree Analysis 
Event Tree (ET) analysis is an inductive (bottom-up) method that begins with an 
initiating event (IE) and propagates through branches or pivotal events (PE) and 
terminates with multiple end states or consequences depending on the path followed in 
the event. Pivotal events may represent success or failure of barriers. The success and 
failure probabilities at branch points can in turn be analyzed by FT and hence an event 
tree can represent a full incident starting from base causes upto consequence 
determination. Determination of probability of consequences is then easily done for a 
known path. ET however cannot address interdependence of basic events in the different 
FT that are attached to it [5]. Static or time independent ET are simple and easy to 




tree (time dependent) allows realistic modeling. They assume that among common base 
event nested in different FT connected to the ET, if one base event did not occur in a FT 
connected to a prior pivotal event then that event does not occur in the FT connected to a 
later pivotal event also. [42]. 
 
2.3.3. Markov Chain Analysis 
A probability model is a stochastic process that describes the evolution of a 
system changing randomly in time. A Markov Chain (MC) represents such a process 
through description of states of the system and their transition rates. This enables 
modeling of time dependent behavior of dynamic stochastic systems. A system is said to 
be Markovian if it exhibits the property that the probability of being in a particular state 
depends only on the state attained in the previous transition and not on ones before that 
[62]. This assumption to an extent, limits the applicability of MC to general dynamic 
systems [13]. The biggest limitation is seen during modeling of large complex systems 
where it is possible to attain numerous states from one previous state. In such cases there 
occurs state space explosion that can exponentially increase computational requirements 
and time (for example, in a system with n basic components, the number of states can be 
2n). 
 
2.3.4. Bayesian Network 
A Bayesian network (BN) is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) consisting of nodes 




effect relationship between the variables. It has been used in the field of dependability, 
risk analysis, and maintenance areas for quite some time now [1]. It allows merging of 
various kinds of data, including expert opinion and missing data. It is a probable model 
that can be used for cumulative risk assessment. 
Local conditional dependencies can be handled in a BN since nodes directly 
connect causes that influence an effect. It can be used for both predictive as well as 
diagnostic analysis [37].  
Popularity of BN lies in its ability to address complex systems with dependencies 
and common cause failure among its components. It allows modeling of multi-state 
variables and can represent several system failure possibilities, which are not possible in 
a FT.  Bobbio et al. showed how FT can be mapped onto a BN while maintaining its 
Boolean properties to incorporate multi-state variables and dependencies [38]. Further 
efforts have been made successfully to map the various logical gates in a dynamic fault 
tree into discrete time Bayesian network (DTBN) [41, 63, 64]. Bearfield et. al. showed a 
method for mapping an ET onto a BN [39] and later on Khakzad et al. carried out 
dynamic safety analysis by mapping a bow-tie into a BN [41]. Barua et. al. further 
showed how DBN can be used to model dependent failures of a system[64].  
To allow determination of uncertainty in parameter estimation, there has been a 
shift from discrete variable to continuous distributions in recent times. Analytical 
method for computation of continuous distribution limits the number of distribution 
types that can be used. Hence, numerical approaches are preferred, though they are 




as Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation or dynamic discretization to reduce 
the computational load and allow modeling in BN with continuous variables [65-68].  
The programs allow use of equations that can reflect how each variable interacts with 
each other, giving the modeler greater flexibility in developing a network and minimizes 
the trouble of handling large number of Boolean data to fill the conditional probability 
tables.  
With the development of such software, greater advantages of BN are being 
realized through the application of Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis. These enable 
probability updating of generic data using plant-specific data or observed data, thus 
minimizing source-to-source data uncertainty. Past data are fed as evidence/likelihood to 
determine posterior probabilities in the first stage of Bayesian analysis and then these 
posterior are used as priors to fit the evidence from the plant in question, giving rise to 
plant specific data[69]. This stage-by-stage updating is the reason behind the naming. 
Khakzad et al. showed a two-step Bayesian updating to develop a case specific posterior 
distribution for an initiating event using generic and case specific precursor data [41]. 
Real time updating of data will be possible with BN and has been shown by many 
researchers [70]. 
 
2.3.5. Petri Nets 
Petri Nets are directed bipartite graphs consisting of two types of nodes called 
places (P) and transitions (T) in which places are connected to transitions and transitions 




an event that changes the state of a system. A place may contain one or more tokens 
each of which represents the status of the place. Movement of token from one state 
(place) to another occurs through the ‘firing’ of transitions and captures the dynamic 
behavior of a system. 
PN is a powerful modeling formalism that allows cyclic processes to be modeled, 
unlike the BN or the ET. Thus, components undergoing failure-repair cycles can be well 
modeled in PN. Analytical methods are possible only for small Markov systems but for 
large ones (and non-Markovian ones) simulation such as Monte Carlo is used. Stochastic 
Petri Nets (SPN) are based on simulating the dynamic behavior of a system via 
movement of tokens through various states (places) and then obtaining probabilistic 
values by statistical analysis. 
Liu et al. described how every logic gate, including AND and OR gates of a 
Fault Tree can be modeled in Petri Nets [71]. Bobbio et al. developed the Parametric 
Fault Tree that he used for modeling in PN and Nyvlt et. al. developed a PN-based 
model of a complex event tree [37, 44]. Application of PN has been limited by their long 
simulation time which occurs due to the massive number of states that can occur even 
for a small system and by their weakness in handling low frequency events which is 
crucial while performing risk analysis of rare events [1].  
 
2.3.6. Summary of learnings from literature 
An analysis of each of the tools and a case study was conducted for this research 




the benefit and difficulty of using each of them [43]. The results obtained from FT, ET 
and BN were the same with the values obtained from PN varying slightly due to the 
randomness of Monte Carlo simulation. ET and FT were found to be simple, graphical 
and easy to use, but by themselves they allowed only static models to be developed. 
However, they can be mapped onto BN to be made dynamic and to consider 
dependencies and uncertainties of parameters. The BN required smaller number of nodes 
than PN which made it easier to use and understand.   
A setback for discrete BN was the large number of input values required in its 
conditional probability tables (CPT) when the number of parent nodes increased. This 
setback can be greatly minimized through the use of continuous distribution nodes that 
allows each child node to be described as a function of its parent nodes through an 
equation [66].  Nodes with different distribution functions can be inferred in the same 
network. This convolution can increase the required computational time since the 
process now requires sampling of the data through simulation embedded in the software. 
However, it still requires much less time than Petri Nets.  
For larger system, due to the large number of place and transition nodes, PN can 
lose its transparency and become less explicable. An advantage of PN was its ability to 
properly model an order of events and handle firing delays which may be immediate, 
deterministic, exponential, or Poisson in a single model. This means any action that 
requires a certain sojourn time till execution are well modelled by Petri Nets, thus giving 




software, but it requires more careful consideration of how the network is developed and 
may not be as explicit.  
BN readily allows incorporation of expert judgement and handling of different 
sorts of data. For PN, this is still in the development phase. Some recent work utilizes 
fuzzy sets in Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPN) to handle uncertainty associated 
with expert opinion while another brings together condition monitoring data and expert 
opinion together through a Plausible Petri Net (PPN) model [72, 73]. 
Perhaps the greatest advantage offered by BN for our purpose is that, being based 
on Bayes theorem, it allows past data to be used with new data to get a more informative 
understanding of risk. Hierarchical Bayesian analysis reduces source-to source 
variability of data for more plant-specific assessments. PN lags this provision 
BN attains results by probabilistic inference of connected nodes whereas for PN, 
probabilistic values are obtained by statistical analysis of the behavior of process via 
simulation. In that context, these two tools achieve their common goal through different 
approaches which gives rise to different pros and cons of each method. Selection of 
whether to use BN or PN should depend on the intended application and the way one 
wants to view the system.  
In order to carry out cumulative risk assessment, both methods have provisions 
for modeling the interaction of various deviations. However, BN allows consideration of 
dependencies and updating of probabilities, and if a BN is copied and run at a different 
time slice (as in a DBN), it allows for a quantified dynamic risk assessment. Although 




explosion of the number of nodes in a PN for even a simple system and the required 
computation time as a result of this makes utilization of BN more preferable. 
 
2.4. Quantification of human and organizational factors (HOF)  
Incidents such as the Long Island disaster led to the realization that risk 
assessment should consider the impact of human and management decision on system 
failure. In 1992, Embrey noted that failure data collected from the field were not 
intrinsic properties but were much influenced by management of these components in 
the system [74]. He provided a generic model called MACHINE (Model of Accident 
Causation using Hierarchical Influence Network) where he showed that human error and 
hardware failures were affected by multiple levels of causal influences that were related 
to organization and management. 
Most methods rely on expert opinions to express the level of impact management 
has had on system failure.  We look at the various attempts to that has been made in the 
past in this regard.  
The MANAGER method was developed in the early 90s through analysis of 921 
incidents to provide generic failure frequencies (historical average) of contributing 
factors behind the incidents [75, 76]. These generic frequencies were then made plant-
specific by multiplication with a single score of Management Factor (MF):  
FEstimate= (MF)×(FGeneric) 
Values for MFs were obtained through a scoring system that involved experts 




aspects within their facility on a three-point scale (good, average, bad). A ternary graph 
was developed to determine the value of MF from the scores obtained through the 
questionnaire. Line drawn on the ternary diagram to determine value of MF from the 
scores were also obtained from expert opinion and were site-specific.  
Davoudian et al. suggested the Work Process Analysis Model (WPAM), 
modifying it to WPAM-II to consider dependencies among organizational factors that 
affected the failure of systems [77, 78]. Organizational culture (including safety culture, 
time urgency, ownership) were shown to indirectly influence the failure rate of 
equipment and human operation. WPAM used a three-step procedure that used task 
analysis and expert opinion to defined the relative importance of organizational factors 
for each process. Logical combinations of minimal cut sets (MSC) allowed bringing 
basic events such as hardware failure, human error, common cause failure together to 
determine incident frequencies. WPAM II offered a modification to this method by 
suggesting that organizational factors (such as inadequate training, improper 
maintenance procedure) could induce failure of dissimilar equipment as well [78]. For 
the quantification, WPAM II stated that changes in frequencies due to organizational 
factors were second order effects and used the success likelihood index (SLI) procedure 
to update the MCS frequencies. 
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where p1 is the probability of the first event and the p2|1 is the probability of the second 
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Rj and Wj represent the rating and the weight of organizational factors that are 
determined from expert judgement using the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) [78]. 
The System-Action-Management (SAM) framework, published by Pate-Cornell 
et al. in 1996, suggested that incidents had organizational factors at their roots which 
influenced the management decisions and actions. These in turn influenced the basic 
events of system’s failure [8]. SAM provided an analytical approach to consider the 
probability of a system failure under a given set of management factors. The physical 
system’s failure probability was given as  
	| =   	 ,  	 	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where F represented a physical failure or a loss level, IE represented the initiating events 
that led to failure and DA were the decisions and actions that contributed to the initiating 
event and the failure. This meant that the management affected a physical system’s 
failure probability through a set of human actions and decisions. Expert opinion and 
physical system failure statistics were used for the analysis [8]. 
Papazoglou et. al. carried out an analysis of observed incidents in chemical 
facilities and identified eight (out of a total of 54) major underlying failure causes that 
appeared frequently in those incidents [79]. The work was based on the Process Risk 
Management Audit (PRIMA) system developed by Hurst et al. to give a quantitative 
measure of process safety management system (PSMS) for direct use in quantitative risk 




Main Audit Areas (MAA), to provide subjective expert judgement and the results were 
assessed and converted to a single score ai. The generic failure frequency fmd, taken from 
the RIDDOR database was then updated to get a modified frequency fmod using the 
following equation: 
log $%& = log $& + ∑ )*+,
   
where xi can attain values of -1,0 and +1 depending on whether the audit judges the plant 
safety management system as ‘good’, ‘average’ or ‘bad’ respectively.   
Due to the presence of large number of equipment and human, operational and 
organizational factors to consider, a more structured approach was required. The 
previous work was extended to carry out assessment of safety indicators using audit. The 
project was termed I-Risk. It used audit to quantify the quality of the safety management 
system which was then used to update the base events of its fault free. The frequency 
was modified using the following relation [49, 81]: 
ln  = ./0 +
./1 − ./0
10 5 
where fj is the modified parameter, fl is the lower value and fu is the upper value of each 
parameter for an installation with the best safety management system in the industry. 
These values were based on expert elicitation. I-Risk was different from PRIMA or 
MANAGER because while the latter attempted to find a single score as a modifying 
factor for updating failure rates, I-Risk linked management factors (termed ‘delivery 
systems’) to the base events of fault trees generated during QRAs. By applying the 
notion that the delivery systems were common to various events in the fault trees, I-Risk 




the link between the audit findings and the events of the fault tree were not well 
established and the required analysis and audit were not very practical [82]. 
Building upon the I-Risk project with an addition of an indicator on safety 
culture, the Accidental Risk Assessment Methodology for IndustrieS (ARAMIS) project 
was developed. This project aimed to put a chain of methods that led to determination of 
the impact a particular facility will have on its surrounding, given the current condition 
of its safety barriers [83, 84]. It tried to change the link from the delivery systems to the 
events of the fault tree in I-Risk to link between the delivery system and safety barriers. 
Duijm et al. provided a barrier-oriented quantification method for the ARAMIS project 
[82], basing the probability of failure on demand (PFD) of a SIL on the design value and 
suggesting that in reality, the value will be less because of deficiencies in safety 
management system. 




LC (level of confidence) refers to the reliability of a SIL system, Si is the audit rating for 
the management factor (delivery system) corresponding to structural element i and Bi,k  
is an array of weight factors linking the importance of the delivery system linked to i to 
the barrier type k affected.  
Mosleh et al. provided a parametric model for incorporating the influence of 
organizational factors using the ω-factor model [85]. The total failure rate was  




where the ‘inherent’ failure rate B is usually determined through testing of an equipment 
by the manufacturer (beyond the influence of the plant) or can be seen as the individual 
characteristic of an operator (in case of human performance reliability). The rate of 
failure due to organizational factors B% increased the total failure rate. The factor D =
B% BE  represented this increase. For failure being affected by maintenance, the 






Where GH is the probability of a worker’s performance being adversely affected by 
organizational factors (for maintenance, GH can be the ratio of the number of 
maintenance-caused failures to the total number of maintenance activities conducted 
I$:<;) and T is the operating time. In this model the consideration of time and hence 
rate added a dynamic aspect to the assessment. Most of the conditional probabilities of 
influences are estimated from expert opinion, but provisions are made for incorporation 
of field data if available, making the ω-factor model more data-driven than others. 
The impact of human and organizational factors on SIL were studied by 
Schönbeck et al.  [86]. This group suggested the use of a factor θ that represents the 
sensitivity of safety instrumented systems to human and organizational factors and 
proposed using the following equation to determine the existing SIL level. 








Here the rating Ri and Wi were to be obtained from expert opinion again. It was noted 
that although weights could be obtained from accident data analysis, due to the rarity of 
incidents, it was better to seek expert elicitation for values. Values obtained indicated if 
the operational SIL level was the same as designed and did not update the existing 
failure rate of the instruments. 
Organizational Risk Influence Model (ORIM) were proposed by Øien to be used 
as a tool for monitoring risk in offshore installation [50]. The author used Bayesian 
Network to tackle the possibility of multistate representation and the intuitive connection 
between the organizational factors with the technical ones. Each organizational factor 
could be assessed by multiple indicators. The measured value of each indicator was 
converted to a rating value and were brought together using weights (determined from 
expert opinion) to obtain the rating for the organizational factor being assessed. The 
weightage used for bringing the factors together could be obtained from experts or could 
be data driven. Bayesian network propagation algorithm was used to take account of the 
rating of the organizational factors as well as previously observed leak events. For the 
weightage of how each organizational factor contributed to the failure rate, a rather 
complex process was developed utilizing concepts of Hidden Markov Model, Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo simulations, expert judgment, Maximum Likelihood Estimation and 
Cox Model of Proportional Hazards. The values had basis on analysis of 92 previous 
leak incidents and the process attempted to estimate the conditions that existed in the 




The number of times each factor contributed to incident were assumed to be Poisson 
distributed. 
An easy method to make data more plant specific to account for local operating 
conditions is outlined in the CCPS Guideline [87] . The method is straight forward and 
uses correction factors based on judgement. When company practices vary, this method 
can provide uncertain outcomes [75]. The MIL-HDBK-217F also offers constant values 
called π factors that modify the base failure rate. These are, however, constant values 
and  organization influences the failure rate in a linear manner [88].  
The API RP 581, published in 2000, provides a simpler methodology to modify 
generic equipment failure rates through use of ‘modification factors’ based on design 
data and site inspection. It was developed to be a better version of that suggested by 
CCPS [89]. It provides look-up tables based on the number and category of inspection 
for estimation of the probability of failures due to corrosion, erosion etc. As Pitblado et. 
al. mentions, this method was developed based on findings about 20 years ago. 
Management systems have changed significantly, values have changed and this method 
is no longer valid for application [75].  
With the development of the bowtie method formed from a combination of event 
trees and fault trees, the barrier concept became more accepted. Barriers were capable of 
addressing operational risks and the bowtie made clear what barriers were in place, what 
factors affected their effectiveness and how they can be managed [75]. Studies were 
conducted to identify what barriers were present in upstream facilities and methods were 




Barrier and Operational Risk Assessment  (BORA) method [11, 90] used the similar 
scoring method to compare ‘risk influencing factors (RIF)’ with industry average Pave to 
modify values for operational factors that could affect barrier conditions. 
Prev(A) = Pave(A)∑ MN<,
  
A modification to this method, called Risk_OMT, came with the development of 
the Hybrid Causal Logic (HCL), discussed in Section 1.3.1.1. The HCL allowed the 
RIFs to be integrated with the basic events of the fault tree and be mapped onto a 
Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) [12, 45, 46]. The RIFs were obtained by the same 
scoring method and was applied for evaluating risk in an offshore installation. 
The TEC2O considers an improved version of API 581 as the Technical 
Modification Factor (TMF) and multiplies it with the Management Modification Factor 
(MMF) to obtain an overall modification factor for generic failure frequencies [91]. For 
TMF, indicators covering aspects of ageing, environment, construction and process are 
considered, whereas for MMF, aspects of operation and organization are included [92]. 
The equation used is 
 = O × F ×   
where fb is the baseline frequency or generic frequency. Values for TMF and MMF are 
obtained through the scoring of specific indicators (S) and application of weights (wt) 
obtained from expert opinion (or all scores are assumed to carry equal weights). The 
score and the weights are combined as 
Q = ∑ ,MR<,




This combined value is used to obtain TMF and MMF from a relationship graph. How 
the relationship graph was obtained was not clearly explained. 
 
2.4.1. Summary of findings 
Where the scoring method is used, a complete reliance on expert judgement is required. 
The number of questions that the experts are required to answer are also very large, 
usually being more than one hundred. Expert opinions may vary, and though may 
methods have been suggested for eliciting and analyzing the results, they may not reflect 
the exact plant conditions [17, 93]. The expertise of the expert himself may be 
questioned too. Also, it is not possible to gather up experts to redo the questionnaire 
whenever an operation is undertaken. Thus, the dynamic risk assessment may become a 
static one with risk values indicating plant situation many months back. 
 
2.5. Techniques for updating risk with time 
One of the challenges for assessing cumulative risk is to keep data used for the 
assessment updated and precise. Most of the data used in the industry and by other 
researchers are either obtained from generic failure data, from manufacturers’ 
recommendations or through expert opinions. Updating the data allows for incorporation 
of changes in the system over time and also makes the data plant specific. 
Bayesian Network has been widely used for this purpose due to its capability of 
updating beliefs based on new information as they became available, i.e. as new failures 




Meel et. al. showed how incident database from a chemical facility could be 
utilized to provide likelihood data for a Bayesian updating of current failure probabilities 
to obtain a posterior/updated one [94, 95]. Kalantarnia et. al. developed a method based 
on the work by Meel et. al. to develop a predictive model for probability of an incident 
based on ‘accident precursor data’ (which are events that are not incidents, but indicate 
an increased likelihood of one) from expert feedback and plant specific data [96].  
Later, Rathnayaka et. al. developed the System Hazard Identification, Prediction 
and Prevention (SHIPP) model using the concept of Bayesian updating to use near-
misses and incident information to predict the number of incidents in a future and update 
the failure probabilities of different barriers [97, 98].  They adapted the failure tree 
model developed by Kujath et. al. that showed the different factors that contributed to 
barrier conditions in offshore installations and converted each to fault trees [99]. The 
model was modified to include human and management barriers as well. Event tree 
analysis was used to depict the consequences for failure of different barriers with 
severities defined as near miss, mishap, incident and accident. While the fault trees 
showed how failure of a factor contributed to failure of a barrier, the event tree showed 
how failure of each barrier gave rise to various severities of consequences. Information 
regarding the number of scenarios in each severity were obtained from analysis of 
various abnormal scenarios in an offshore facility. This information was used to 
determine the likelihood of those abnormal incidents (taken as Poisson distribution of 
failure frequency λ which is a prior gamma distribution). Based on conjugate property, 




determine the probability distribution of the number of abnormal events in the next time 






Further, the likelihood data was used to update the failure frequencies of each barrier 
assuming each severity to be due to failure of a particular set of barrier failure and taking 
failure frequency of each barrier failure to be an independent random variable.  
 Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis (HBA) has been used frequently in recent times 
to update generic data with plant specific data. HBA is so called because it utilizes a 
hierarchy of prior distributions. Generally, a two-stage updating of the prior is utilized 
whereby a population variability curve is generated in the first stage and a plant-specific 
data is used to update the variability curve in the second stage. 
If θ id the unknown parameter of interest, the Bayes Theorem gives 
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Where π0(θ) is the prior distribution of θ, f(x|θ) is the likelihood function, or the aleatory 
model of x given values of θ and π1(θ) is the posterior distribution of θ [69, 100]. 
Observed data are fed to the equation via the likelihood function.   
In HBA, we first use a prior to represent the population variability (the variability in the 
data sources) and then specify a second prior to represent the epistemic uncertainty 
associated with the parameters of the first-stage prior [68]. The prior distribution for a 







(θ|φ is the first-stage prior distribution of θ conditioned upon φ and represents 
the variation in θ in the population. ](c is the hyperprior representing the uncertainty 
in φ or the prior knowledge and its components are termed hyperparameters [69]. 
Various methods have been proposed using HBA to update probability distributions with 
new data  [101, 102] 
Mohaghegh et. al. outlines a socio-technical safety causal model SoTeRiA that 
brings organizational factors with technical ones using big data analytics in Bayesian 
Belief Network [103-106]. The method suggests using investigation reports, developed 
models and various other documents handled in a facility to update the risk assessment 
model. However, though what needs to be done is suggested, implementation method 
and obtaining risk values are yet to be shown. The relations among the various factors 
have not been shown, and hence the model is still incomplete. 
 
2.5.1. Summary of learnings from literature 
Although it is suggested that if barriers are updated, then by the diagnosis 
capability of Bayesian networks, one may update probabilities of basic events, these 
basic events are actually conditioned on the barrier failure and does not reflect true 
probabilities [107]. In a dynamic system, changes in the values of probabilities may 
make some contributing factors to have more effect on the barrier than previously 
determined. Thus, this suggestion of updating probabilities of basic events from updated 




learning from incidents and incorporating the learning into the risk assessment model 
may be the best way to understand how the system changes and what changes cause 
failures.  
 
2.6. Gap identification 
From the past approaches that have been developed to assess overall risk in a 
plant, we identify that it is essential to develop a model that captures the non-linear 
interaction of various factors and also provides a feedback loop whereby the actions 
resulting from decisions or changes can be understood. On the other hand, simple 
models such as fault tree and event trees are preferred to maintain the transparency of the 
risk assessment. There does not exist a model that can do both. 
In terms of the tool to use for risk assessment, fault trees and event trees mapped 
onto BN and BN by itself appear to be the best choice to move forward.  
As noted from the literature review, quantification methods to incorporate the 
effect of human and organizational behavior not only gives the overall value of risk, it 
also allows for making generic data plant specific. Most of the methods developed 
however rely on expert opinion.  The use of the expert opinion or scoring method has its 
limitations for dynamic risk assessment: the only way it can capture the dynamic nature 
of a changing system is by asking for experts’ updated opinion, which is difficult since 
the process of gather opinions is lengthy and accumulating reliable opinion from 
multiple experts is not always feasible. There has been attempts to utilize past incident 




gathered from various facilities and to make the data plant-specific, expert opinion had 
been reverted to again.  
The use of Bayesian Network to update failure frequencies of barriers is a fairly 
new concept and hierarchical Bayesian analysis allows learning from incidents to be 
absorbed into risk assessment method. Since catastrophic events are very rare in the 
industry, the concept allows information from the more frequent near- misses and 
smaller incidents as well as incidents in other facilities to be utilized to update 
knowledge about barrier conditions so that we can predict the probability of large 
incidents. However, the method applied in the SHIPP model allows updating only the 
barrier failure probabilities from near-misses and small incidents but does not tell us 
what contributing factors are more likely to cause the failure. Using information about 
various types of incidents may allow updating barriers, but what contributed to the 
barrier failure can only be understood if the failure probabilities of the basic events or 
contributing factors behind the barriers are updated.  
Risk assessments should be up to date and frequently done to be aware of any 
factors contributing to barrier failures and to take necessary measures whenever needed. 
The use of Bayesian network and learning from incidents and other available data from 
the facility to update the network seems to be a better approach than seeking expert 
elicitation every time a risk assessment is needed. The use of Dynamic Bayesian 
Network would provide an easy way to assess dynamic risk. Visualization of the 
changes in risk with time can be obtained, which is not possible by any other method 




incidents, via investigation. Findings from investigations can then be applied to update 
the basic events or contributing factors and these will show the present barrier health 
condition. This can be further extended to bring information from other sources such as 










3.1. The Reflected-Pyramid Concept 
For plant-specific and dynamic risk assessment, we need to utilize information 
generated within the facility itself over time. As mentioned above, one of the starting 
points for extracting site-specific information to understand existing risk situations is to 
learn from failures that have occurred in the past to reveal the dynamic patterns behind 
them. Experimental determination of failures is not always feasible: equipment failures 
are largely dependent on their operating environment and how they are maintained, 
while organizational failures are impossible to experiment with. As Coze mentions, it is 
rather difficult to determine ahead of time what will go organizationally wrong due to 
the large amount of information [34]. He also states that organizational studies focusing 
on normal operations are extremely difficult since what can go wrong is not as clear as it 
is after an incident.  Also, it is difficult to learn from incidents since large scale incidents 
are rare. If the idea behind Heinrich’s Safety Pyramid is extended, much more 
information can be generated through analysis of near misses as well as minor incidents 
that occur within the facility [26, 108]. Figure 1 depicts how information from various 
incidents and near misses can be used to constantly update our knowledge about the 
management system of a facility [109].  
                                                 
* Parts of this section are reprinted with permission from “A journey to excellence in process safety 
management” by SZ Halim and MS Mannan, 2018. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 






Figure 1: The Reflected-Pyramid Concept: Learning and Extracting Mechanism 
*Reprinted with permission from “A journey to excellence in process safety 
management” by SZ Halim and MS Mannan, 2018. Journal of Loss Prevention in 
the Process Industries, 55,71-79, Copyright [2018] by Elsevier.  
 
Near-misses (where the last line of defense is challenged) and incidents, as 
shown at the bottom of the triangle, can be investigated to identify the direct/immediate 
causes that led to their occurrence. These will usually emerge as technical or operational 
factors, such as equipment failure or human error, respectively. These 




questions such as why an equipment failed, or why there was operational error). This 
will usually help identify a larger number of organizational or managerial issues (such as 
maintenance backlog, understaffing, lack of training) which contributed to the direct 
causes. In this manner, investigation of near misses and incidents can eventually lead to 
a better understanding of the organizational limitations which reside within the system 
and may play a role behind future incidents. This information can be used to update 
failure data of the system. Extraction of data from these incidents will be independent of 
the investigation process. In Figure 1, the smaller red arrows in between the pyramids 
indicate that information about organizational factors extracted from investigation 
reports from the lower triangle can be applied to the bottom part of the upper triangle.  
The upper triangle in Figure 1 represents predicting the risk of future barrier 
failure. Here, organizational or managerial limitations are seen to contribute towards 
technical or operational failure, ultimately causing barrier failure. Failure of barriers can 
lead to a near-miss or incident. Information about any barrier failure (with or without an 
incident) can be used to re-update information about the organizational factors by again 
starting from the bottom part of the lower triangle (via the larger red arrow) creating a 
feedback loop.  
In this way, it is possible to keep updating information about the management 
system through continual investigation of barrier failures and keeping the risk 
assessment dynamic. Barrier failures act as a feedback to the way the facility is managed 
and allows completion of a learning loop. This model can be further applied to all 




Development of a simple mechanism for extracting data from all failures can provide an 
easy pathway to continually update information to provide a more dynamic look at risk. 
 
3.2. Framework for Cumulative Risk Assessment 
The reflected-pyramid concept shown in Figure 1 forms the basis for assessment 
of the plant-specific and dynamic health condition of barriers to predict cumulative risk. 
This concept allows identification of organizational limitations from past incidents, 
recognition of previously unknown combination of causes that led to failure, and 
extracting relevant information from data sources to quantify non-technical factors for 
assessing cumulative risk. 
Figure 2 shows the framework for cumulative risk assessment to assess barrier 
health. When a significant amount of data from the past incidents and operation of a 
facility is available, the risk assessment model can be established. Past data provides a 
prior knowledge about the way barriers have failed in the past. As new data becomes 
available, this knowledge is updated to determine the current condition of a barrier 
(through the use of Bayesian analysis). In the absence of sufficient data, generic or 
industry-averaged data can be used to begin with, which can later be updated with plant-










The following chapters provide step-by-step guide on how this framework is to be 
established. It begins with analysis of past incidents and moves on to answer the 
following questions: 
- What are the factors that contribute to an incident?  
- What is the rate at which each factor has been occurring in the past and how can 
they be used to estimate future failure probabilities?  
- How do these factors interact with each other to increase the risk?  
Due to the novelty of this work, this thesis first establishes the methodology for 
generation of generic data, showing how non-technical factors are identified, quantified 
and used for developing a risk assessment model based on learnings. Through a case 
study, it also shows how the model can be updated with time to capture the dynamic 
changes in risk in a facility. Bayesian network is used for development of the 
framework.  
 
3.3. Step-by-step method for CRA 
3.3.1. Step 1: Learning and extracting information from incidents  
For any near miss or incident reported, an investigation has to be conducted and a 
report must be presented. This investigation report is used to obtain information to assess 
barrier conditions. For this research, we apply this step to investigation reports of US 
OCS offshore facilities.  
This step is performed by breaking it down into the following tasks: 




- Use developed methodology to analyze incident investigation reports to identify 
contributing factors behind each incident 
This constitutes Chapter 4. 
 
3.3.2. Step 2: Generation of generic and plant-specific failure data to estimate 
frequency/probability of occurrence  
Step 2 looks at using data generated in Step 1 (Chapter 4) for updating the technical 
and non-technical failure rates and probabilities to capture the dynamicity of the system. 
Mathematical formulations for updating technical factors from generic data are readily 
available in literature [110, 111] and are adopted. In this work, this step will focus on 
showing how generic data can be generated for non-technical factors and can be updated 
as plant data becomes available.  Step 2 includes the following tasks: 
- Adopt a mathematical formulation for updating failure rates of equipment 
- Propose a method for determining prior quantity about failure chances of non-
technical factors (estimation of generic data)  
- Modify generic information using plant-specific data 
This constitutes Chapter 5. 
 
3.3.3. Step 3: Estimation of how various factors combine to increase risk  
Step 3 uses the learning from Step 1 (Chapter 4) to determine all possible path by 




Importance of each path is expressed by assigning weightage that is calculated from the 
analysis in Step 1. Step 3 performs the following task: 
- Estimate the weightage of various combinations of contributing factors from 
previous incidents  
This constitutes Chapter 6. 
 
3.3.4. Step 4: Dynamic Barrier Health: Estimating cumulative probabilistic risk  
With an understanding from Step 1 and quantitative results from Steps 2 and 3, the risk 
assessment model is developed to merge all technical and non-technical factors in Step 
4. To assess the risk of barrier failure in the future the following tasks are performed: 
- Construct a model for barrier analysis, based on contributing factors identified in 
Step 1.  
- Using values of failure probabilities determined in Step 2 and weightage of their 
combination in Step 3, conduct the probabilistic risk assessment to analyze 
dynamic cumulative risk. 






Figure 3: Methodology for a cumulative risk assessment showing how the task 
performed in each step lead to the development of the model. 
 
Figure 3 shows the steps to be followed for cumulative risk assessment and hence 
outlines the organization of the thesis. Each of the steps are covered by the subsequent 





4. LEARNING AND EXTRACTING INFORMATION FROM INCIDENTS† 
 
4.1. Background 
Offshore platforms are generally characterized by a high degree of congestion 
created by a network of pipelines and other equipment essential for the operations. Also, 
the rigs have limited ventilation and difficult escape routes, which increase the risk of 
working in these environments. Under these circumstances, a minor event can quickly 
accelerate into a catastrophe. Many such incidents have occurred in the past that have led 
to large loss of assets and human life and tremendous damage to the environment in 
terms of pollution. The Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Macondo oil well and the 
Piper Alpha disaster in the North Sea are a few examples of events that had far-reaching 
effects on the society and regulatory infrastructure. Some of the known incident 
scenarios in offshore facilities include blowouts, liquid and vapor leaks, fires and 
explosions, vessel collisions, dropped objects and structural failures [112, 113]. It is thus 
essential to understand why these incidents occur in order to develop an awareness of 
conditions that have the potential to lead to disasters. This will enable timely measures to 
be taken to prevent them from occurring.  
Over the years, researchers have indicated the need to investigate incidents and 
near misses to harness the information to prevent recurrences [114-116]. Many authors 
                                                 
† Reprinted with permission from “In search of causes behind offshore incidents: Fire in offshore oil and 
gas facilities” by S.Z. Halim, S. Janardanan, T. Flechas, and M.S. Mannan, 2018. Journal of Loss 




have been involved in examining the causes behind past industrial incidents. Kidam et. 
al. analyzed 364 chemical process industry (CPI)-related incidents that occurred from 
1964-2003 [117]. They used a database that contained extensive information to 
determine the frequency and importance of various contributing factors behind the 
incidents. They found that human and organizational factors were the largest 
contributors (19%). Okoh et al. analyzed major incidents caused by maintenance and 
related activities in various process industries [118, 119]. The main objective of the 
study was to understand how maintenance influenced the occurrence of incidents to 
facilitate an understanding of the required measures to prevent them. They classified the 
causes based on their Work and Accident Process (WAP) classification scheme.  The 
work was based on the investigation of incidents with maintenance related issues only. 
Kannan et al. collected and analyzed 96 incidents from across the world in a one-year 
period in order to identify deficiencies in safety management systems [120]. The 
incidents were classified based on the geographic zone, type of industry (upstream, 
midstream, downstream), incident category (fire, explosion, release) and substance 
involved. The analysis used the 20 elements of risk-based process safety management 
approach. Some of the most important factors that contributed to the incidents were: 
deficiency of safe work practices, operating procedures and conduct of operations. 
Mannan et. al analyzed 5 years of United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA)'s accidental release information program database to identify common primary 
and contributing causes that led to chemical releases [121]. Their study found that 




training, by-pass conditions, unsuitable equipment, faulty process design, weather 
conditions, unknown conditions and others were the contributing factors behind 
incidents. They concluded that issues such as data integrity, taxonomy of the database, 
and differences among facilities may present certain drawbacks when analyzing these 
databases.  
Although many researchers have analyzed past incidents, most of these are 
limited to specific sectors of industry or the chemical industry in general. Very limited 
work has been done that are focused on the offshore oil and gas industry specifically. 
Operation in different industries vary by the type of equipment used, the environment, 
the required skills of personnel involved, the material handled and so on. Thus, a 
generalized analysis encompassing various chemical industries may not be suitable to 
identifying causes behind offshore incidents.  
Hare et. al. developed a report, which provided details regarding the underlying 
causes of offshore incidents [122]. The document is based on the analysis of 67 offshore 
incidents obtained through UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Offshore Safety 
Division (OSD) and RIDDOR (Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous 
Occurrences Regulations) investigation reports. The study only deals with incidents that 
took place between 2004 and 2008 and considered only those incidents that resulted in 
fatalities or major injuries or both. However, to gain a better understanding of the causes 
behind offshore incidents, it is important to not only consider major incidents, but also 




occur in offshore facilities are not always readily available and this can pose a challenge 
towards learning about the contributing factors behind them.  
Offshore operators operating within the US Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) are 
required to report certain incidents to the Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement (BSEE) District Manager according to the US Code of Federal Regulations 
(30 CFR 250.188) [123, 124]. Their website on offshore incident statistics show that the 
number of incidents reported vary by type (fatalities, injuries, loss of well control, 
fires/explosions, collisions, spills >50 bbls, lifting, gas releases, evacuation musters), and 
by number ranging from 475 to 783 incidents each year between 2009-2016 (fiscal year) 
[125]. This indicates that incidents still keep happening! BSEE conducts investigation of 
these incidents and has taken steps to make some investigation reports publicly available 
through their website [126, 127]. The investigation reports are constantly being added to 
the system as they are generated and hence can aid in providing a good database for 
analyzing causes behind recent offshore incidents. With this view, a study was 
undertaken to analyze 137 fire-related incident investigation reports obtained from the 
BSEE website to provide a more comprehensive statistical summary of various 
underlying technical, operational, human and organizational factors behind these 
offshore incidents in the US OCS [127].  
The remaining part of this chapter provides details about what information was 
available in these reports and how they have been analyzed, followed by a discussion 





4.2. BSEE incident investigation report 
4.2.1. Incident Investigation by BSEE 
Based on the incident reported, BSEE determines the type of investigation that is 
to be conducted by their personnel. Usually incidents that involve fatality, serious injury 
or a major pollution event are investigated in details by a panel that includes 
investigators from BSEE's Safety and Incident Investigations Division, Regional Office 
of Incident Investigations and also from other agencies when needed [123]. These are 
termed Panel Investigation Reports. Some investigations that require less resources are 
conducted by BSEE's district personnel and are delivered as District Investigation 
Reports [123]. All investigations are usually conducted via a combination of witness 
interviews, testing and analysis of involved equipment, and a review of the operators' 
and contractors' documentation [123].  
 
4.2.2. BSEE's List and Status of Incident Investigations 
BSEE has listed information about the investigated incidents in their website and 
as of October 31, 2017, the list showed a total of 1617 panel and district investigations 
conducted from January 4, 1995 till October 31, 2017 in the US OCS (reports prior to 
formation of BSEE in October 2011 had been developed by Minerals Management 
Service (MMS))[128]. This list of status and investigation has been termed as the 
“Investigation Reports Listed” shown in Table 2. Some of these reports are still pending 
completion and not all of the reports are publicly available via the website. The numbers 




Table 2. The table also shows the time range of the incidents whose reports are listed or 
available.  
Table 2: Table showing number and time range of district investigation reports and 
panel investigation reports listed and available via BSEE website (as of October 31, 
2017). *Reprinted with permission from “In search of causes behind offshore 
incidents: Fire in offshore oil and gas facilities” by S.Z. Halim, S. Janardanan, T. 
Flechas, and M.S. Mannan, 2018. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries, 54, 254-265, Copyright [2018] by Elsevier.  




 Time Covered 
No. of 














09/11/2017 859  
Total 
Investigations  1617  960 
 
All investigation reports listed have been categorized according to their type and 
are identified as follows: required evacuation, LTA (1-3 days), LTA (>3 days), RW/JT 
(1-3 days), RW/JT (>3 days), injuries, fatality, pollution, fire, explosion, loss of well 
control, collision, structural damage, crane, other lifting device, damaged/disabled 
system, incident >25K, H2S release, required muster, shutdown from gas release and 




Transfer) [128]. Figure 4 shows the numbers in each category as provided in the BSEE 
investigation list. Each incident may include several categories (e.g. a blowout incident 
may also include fire and other injuries). For clarity, only the types investigated in 
greater numbers are shown here. 
 
Figure 4: Figure shows the top-most type of incidents present in the investigation 
reports listed (in the time range 01/04/1995-09/19/2017) *Reprinted with permission 
from “In search of causes behind offshore incidents: Fire in offshore oil and gas 
facilities” by S.Z. Halim, S. Janardanan, T. Flechas, and M.S. Mannan, 2018. 
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 54, 254-265, Copyright [2018] 
by Elsevier.  
 
Based on the above findings, it can be seen that over the given period, fire 
incidents have been investigated the most (28.4%).  From a process safety point of view, 
fire incidents can indeed bring major catastrophe on an offshore oil/gas facility. This 
paper analyzes 137 fire-related district investigation reports obtained from BSEE’s 




in this study covered incidents that had occurred between calendar years 2004 and 2016. 
Since the panel investigation reports differed significantly from the general format of the 
district investigation report, the analysis was restricted only to the latter. 
 
4.2.3. BSEE District Investigation Reports: 
The district investigation reports are short reports prepared by BSEE 
investigators. All reports have a fixed format whereby different information are filled 
under various sections/categories. The first page has a format similar to that shown in 
Table 3a: it is concise, information about the offshore facility and type of incident and 
causes are indicated under 16 sections. 
Although the general format of all reports remains more or less the same (some 
reports were found to have no information disclosed on certain topics), individual 
investigation reports mainly vary starting from the second page (Table 3b) where the 
investigation findings are diverse and have different lengths of narration. Based on the 
incident occurrences, identified causes and the overall narration, the district investigation 
reports also vary in size. In addition to the first page, or Page 1 (Table 3a), the following 
pages of the reports provide information under various other headings as given in Table 
3b. 
 
4.2.4. BSEE Incident Information 
Some of the sections shown in Tables 3a and 3b provided specific and concise 





Table 3a Table showing the general information presented in the first page (Page 1) 
of district investigation reports. *Reprinted with permission from “In search of 
causes behind offshore incidents: Fire in offshore oil and gas facilities” by S.Z. 
Halim, S. Janardanan, T. Flechas, and M.S. Mannan, 2018. Journal of Loss 
Prevention in the Process Industries, 54, 254-265, Copyright [2018] by Elsevier.  
1. Occurred 







3. Operator/ Contractor 
Representative/ Supervisor on site 
at time of incident 


















o Surface Equipment Failure or 
Procedures 
Collision 
o Historic >$25K <=$25K 
o Structural Damage 
o Crane 
o Other Lifting Device 
o Damaged/Disabled Safety Sys. 
o Incident >$25K 
o H2S/15Min./20ppm 














o Motor Vessel 
o Pipeline Segment No. 
o Other 
7. Type 
o Historic Injury 
o Required Evacuation 
o LTA (1-3 days) 
o LTA (>3 days) 
o RW/JT (1-3 days) 
o Other Injury 
o Fatality 
o Pollution 
o Human Error 
o Shutdown From Gas Release 
o Other 
Cause 
o Equipment Failure 
o Slip/Trip/Fall 
o Weather Related 
o Leak 
o Upset H2O Treating 
o Overboard Drilling Fluid 
o Other 
8. Water Depth 
9. Distance From Shore 
10. Wind Direction             Speed 
11. Current Direction         Speed 
12. Sea State 
13. Pictures Taken 
14. Statement Taken 
15. Operator Representative/ 






Table 3b Table showing information presented in the remaining pages of the 
district investigation reports *Reprinted with permission from “In search of causes 
behind offshore incidents: Fire in offshore oil and gas facilities” by S.Z. Halim, S. 
Janardanan, T. Flechas, and M.S. Mannan, 2018. Journal of Loss Prevention in the 
Process Industries, 54, 254-265, Copyright [2018] by Elsevier.  
17. Investigation Findings 
18. List the Probable Cause(s) of Accident 
19. List the Contributing Cause(s) of Accident 
20. List of Additional Information 
21. Property Damaged, Nature of Damage and Estimated Amount (Total) 
22. Recommendations to Prevent Recurrence 
23. Possible OCS Violations Related to Accident 
24. Specify Violations Directly or Indirectly Contributing 
25. Date of Onsite Investigation 
26. Onsite Team Members  
27. Operator Report on File 
28.Accident Classification 
29. Accident Investigation Panel Formed, OCS Report 





The data collected indicated that most of the incidents occurred Production 
Operations (68%), followed by Others which include Plugging and Abandoning 
Operations, Construction, Maintenance etc. (from section 6 of Table 3a). A significant 
number of incidents also occur during Drilling (Figure 5).  
By comparing the information about the depths of offshore facilities provided 
(from section 9 of Table 3a), it was found that 6% of fire incidents occurred in ultra-
deepwater facilities (>1500 m), 20% in deepwater facilities (125m-1500 m) and the 
remaining 74% occurred in the shelf (<125 m).  
 
 
Figure 5: Figure showing type of operation being conducted when fire occurred 
*Reprinted with permission from “In search of causes behind offshore incidents: 
Fire in offshore oil and gas facilities” by S.Z. Halim, S. Janardanan, T. Flechas, and 
M.S. Mannan, 2018. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 54, 254-
265, Copyright [2018] by Elsevier.  
 
From the property damages reported in the 137 fire incidents (from section 21 of 




$142,000 property lost in each fire incident (including incidents where no damage was 
reported). There were 56 violations found in these incidents, most of which (54%) were 
G-110 violations (related to unsafe and/or unworkmanlike practices, procedures, or 
operations). 
BSEE identifies the causes of incidents into 9 general categories: Equipment 
Failure, Human Error, External Damage, Slip/Trip/Fall, Weather Related, Leak, Upset 
H2O Treating, Overboard Drilling Fluid and Other as seen in Section 8 of Table 3a. Data 
collected on these cause categories from the 137 reports are shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Figure showing the number of times each of the 9 causes were identified 
by BSEE in the sample 137 fire incidents (2004-2016). *Reprinted with permission 
from “In search of causes behind offshore incidents: Fire in offshore oil and gas 
facilities” by S.Z. Halim, S. Janardanan, T. Flechas, and M.S. Mannan, 2018. 
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 54, 254-265, Copyright [2018] 






Here, Equipment Failure (56%) and Human Error (40%) appeared to have been 
the leading causes behind fires in offshore facilities. This was followed by Others (17%), 
where the causes varied significantly.  
However, the investigation findings in Table 3b, Sections 17, 18 and 19 had 
more information narrated than projected concisely as causes in the first page of the 
reports. In addition, identifying issues like leak as a cause did not seem appropriate (a 
leak is usually a consequence of other factors). Thus, the current work digs deeper into 
the incident investigation reports by analyzing the findings in Table 3b to identify the 
common contributing causes behind the fire incidents.  
 
4.3. Methodology for extraction of information from incidents 
For the purpose of this study, each investigation report was studied individually 
by the team members to identify the causes behind offshore fire incidents. The work did 
not follow any particular classification scheme since the intention was to be all inclusive 
and identify all factors that contributed without trying to make the incidents fall in 
predefined buckets of causes. 
Prior to the analysis, attempts were taken to minimize differences in opinion 
among team members so that all reports were treated in the same manner. Initially 
several reports were studied in an attempt to identify how the analysis will be done. 
Team members met several times and developed a list of factors (in addition to the ones 
BSEE already had) that could have contributed to the incidents studied.  Once a 




they discussed and reviewed together to identify the factors that influenced the incident. 
This ensured that all members were on the same ground and inconsistencies were 
minimized between different incident analysis. To ensure clarity among members, a 
question was developed for each factor which, if answered affirmative, would help 
confirm that the factor had contributed to the incident occurrence (Appendix B). 
Sections under Headings 17, 18 and 19 of Table 3b were studied to identify causes. 
Identified causes were only limited to what was mentioned in these sections and team 
members were not allowed to draw their own conclusions. Once all members began to 
agree on the analysis of individual incidents, the work was divided.  
 
 
Figure 7: Figure summarizing the methodology followed in the analysis *Reprinted 
with permission from “In search of causes behind offshore incidents: Fire in 
offshore oil and gas facilities” by S.Z. Halim, S. Janardanan, T. Flechas, and M.S. 
Mannan, 2018. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 54, 254-265, 
Copyright [2018] by Elsevier.  
 
 
A spreadsheet was developed where the factors were listed and the presence of a 
factor in an incident were marked as 1, absence being marked as 0. A provision was kept 




in the spreadsheet. As work progressed, if these factors recurred again and again, they 
were added to the list in the spreadsheet, otherwise, if their occurrence was uncommon, 
they were kept noted under a common heading titled ‘Others’. In the end, all incidents 
were reviewed by the team leader and discrepancies were noted, discussed and resolved. 
Midway through the work, the work was presented to subject matter experts and their 
feedback and comments were incorporated in this work. 
It is to be noted that the methodology applied analyzed the contributing factors 
that led to the fire incidents from the reports and does not/may not reflect the root causes 
behind the incidents. Also, many of the investigations included accounts of 
actions/occurrences that took place once the fire had already initiated and allowed 
keeping a minor fire from becoming a major one. There actions/occurrences were 
considered as consequences and these post-fire activities have not been included in the 
current analysis.  
 
4.4. Analysis of offshore incident investigation reports and identification of 
contributing factors 
Current analysis found 26 contributing factors apart from the 9 causes already 
identified by BSEE. Appendix B shows a list of terms that were used for each 
contributing factor and provides a definition for each that were identified (in addition to 
the list of causes in BSEE’s reports) along with their definitions. The last five terms in 
the list (marked with *) were found to be consequences of fire and hence has not been 




Figure 8 shows the number of times each contributing factor was identified in the 
analysis of the 137 incidents. Each incident involved multiple contributing factors. 
Equipment failure and human error, which had been identified as top causes in the 137 
reports, appeared to have been influenced by other factors. The study thus analyzed the 
other contributing factors that appeared in conjunction with equipment failure and 
human error to get an insight of the causes behind the fires.   
 
Figure 8: Figure showing factors that were identified in the analysis of 137 offshore 
fire incidents’ investigation reports. Factors that were considered but did not 
appear in the investigation reports are not shown here. (JSA refers to Job Safety 
Analysis, PHA refers to Process Hazard Analysis and MOC refers to Management 
of Change) *Reprinted with permission from “In search of causes behind offshore 
incidents: Fire in offshore oil and gas facilities” by S.Z. Halim, S. Janardanan, T. 
Flechas, and M.S. Mannan, 2018. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 






4.4.1. Equipment Failure 
Of the 77 incidents that BSEE marked as being caused by equipment failure, 
there were several where BSEE had identified fires initiating from leaks in pipes/hoses 
connected to a tank as equipment failure. However, according to the working teams’ 
understanding, these were taken as leak incidents rather than equipment failures. Also, it 
was found that use of wrong size of parts of equipment that had led to failure, leak and 
fire had been identified as equipment failure in some cases, but were not in others. 
Similarly, some incidents involving equipment failure were marked as being ‘other’ 
causes with different causes or equipment name written next to it. Such inconsistencies 
in reporting contributed to the differences between the BSEE identified equipment 
failures (77) and the team’s analysis (68).  
The analysis of the 68 incidents where equipment failures were identified is 
shown in Figure 9 along with other important factors that seemed to have contributed to 
the failures. These appeared mostly to reflect laggings in measures which could have 








Figure 9: Figure showing factors that appeared in conjunction with “Equipment 
Failure” incidents identified in the analysis. *Reprinted with permission from “In 
search of causes behind offshore incidents: Fire in offshore oil and gas facilities” by 
S.Z. Halim, S. Janardanan, T. Flechas, and M.S. Mannan, 2018. Journal of Loss 
Prevention in the Process Industries, 54, 254-265, Copyright [2018] by Elsevier.  
 
 
Much of the equipment failure can be attributed to maintenance (41%) which 
was inadequate or not done properly. Thus, maintenance program is important to prevent 
equipment failures leading to fires. Another important factor was degradation of parts 
(25%) or whole equipment either due to excess heat, abrasion, vibration or corrosion. 
Why these occurred may be contributed to factors such as design flaw (22%), improper 
installation (14%), use of equipment/parts (10%) or material (7%) not suited for the 
function or due to lack of maintenance itself. It is interesting how procedure impacted 




most incidents where these two (equipment failure and procedure) were common, an 
improper or inadequate way of conducting a task had initiated an equipment failure that 
eventually led to the fire. This shows that procedure-related issues are playing an 
important role behind failure of equipment. The investigation reports did not provide 
further information that would have allowed to find the deeper causes as to why these 
factors surfaced. 
 
4.4.2. Human Error 
There was a significant difference between the number of incidents with human 
error identified by BSEE (55) and the numbers identified in our analysis (5). This 
difference can be attributed to the fact that the analysis team believed strongly that what 
had been taken as human error were actually actions that were influenced by other 
factors in the system and hence should not blame an individual in that context. As 
Sidney Dekker mentions, the point of investigation is not to find where people went 
wrong, it is to understand why their assessment and actions seemed right at the time 
[129]. Through the analysis of the 55 human-error related incidents that BSEE 
identified, it was found that there were multiple factors in almost every incident that 
could have influenced the human performance and hence cause error. In other cases, 
there were limitations in measures that led to unwanted deviations, which were then 
blamed on the human operator.   
From Figure 10, it can be seen that incidents where human error was identified 




Analysis (PHA) (56%). Although the larger portion of these incidents were related to 
improper JSAs, in overall, it shows that there was an incomplete realization of hazards 
associated with a task or process. Incidents related to Permit to Work were also mostly 
due to this lack of realization of hazards (15%). Although it may be criticized that this 
lack of realization was an error on part of the human, the large number of 
incomplete/improper Job Safety Analysis (JSA) conducted should raise one question: 
why are the JSAs failing? A look at factors behind faulty JSAs should identify causes of 
human error. Incident reports should not stop only at ‘human error’ but look beyond. 
 
 
Figure 10: Figure showing factors that appeared in conjunction with “Human 
Error” identified by BSEE *Reprinted with permission from “In search of causes 
behind offshore incidents: Fire in offshore oil and gas facilities” by S.Z. Halim, S. 
Janardanan, T. Flechas, and M.S. Mannan, 2018. Journal of Loss Prevention in the 





The second and third largest factors are both related to procedure (36% 
Procedural Deviation and 27% Inadequate Procedure). Upon analysis of incidents where 
procedure-issues appeared, it was found that deviation or failure to adhere to procedures 
occurred due to problems such as inadequacy of the procedure itself, ergonomic issues 
and operator busy doing other work and thus failing to pay full attention (multi-tasking). 
There were many investigations that stopped at reporting that the procedure was 
violated, but did not ask further, such as asking the person why he had deviated. This 
would have revealed some important information about the causes that led to human 
error. 
In 20% of these cases, a supervisor had not been present during the job or had not 
provided proper guidance. In one incident, a supervisor had left the facility in a 
helicopter while the work he was supervising was still ongoing. Such factors should be 
looked from an organizational behavior perspective and one needs to ask: why did he 
leave, or why was he allowed to leave? For incidents where supervisors had misguided 
his subordinates, leading them to making errors in a task, it should be asked if the 
supervisor was informed and competent enough to lead the task. Blaming his/her 
subordinates for human error does not capture the whole picture, neither does blaming 
the individual supervisor as making human error help identify causes behind incidents. 
Improper communication showed up in 16% of incidents where BSEE had identified 
human error as a cause. If an operator is not made aware of the hazards through proper 
communication, his actions can lead to unwanted deviations. In this analysis, 




identification of hazardous materials. In one case where a crane operator had rigged up a 
gas line instead of an air pipeline, it was found that the pipelines were not properly 
labelled. The contract crane operator would not have known he was rigging up a wrong 
pipe unless it was properly communicated to him. Similar incidents were found where 
the welder was not informed about hazards associated with presence of fuel gas in the 
vicinity of his work.  
‘Failed to detect’ (11%) occurred usually due to cases where an adequate sensor 
was not present or where the JSA was improper and the presence of flammable material 
were not checked, rendering a false blame on the human for error.  
Incidents where operators had ‘failure to respond on time/delayed response’ 
(11%) had been identified as human error, but analysis shows that these failures arose 
from issues such as operator not being able to reach/find the proper valve/button on time, 
or operator multi-tasking; the previous one being related to ergonomics and the latter one 
being organizational safety culture issue.  
Factors ‘inadequate/lack of maintenance’, ‘degradation of materials’ and 
‘improper inspection’ appeared several times in conjunction with human errors, though 
in much less numbers than those discussed previously. One incident involved inadequate 
tightening of a bolt that led to a leak of flammable fuel. Although at first look it 
appeared as human error, questions about proper procedure, inspection, fool-proofing a 
system arose. Lack of proper maintenance, inspection and their backlog should be 




operators are given proper procedures. Similarly, as can be seen, incidents where design 
flaw had led to fire, human error has been blamed.  
The term ‘other’ factors appeared significantly with ‘human error’ but the 
individual factors under ‘other’ are different from each other. Even then, it needs to be 
mentioned that some of the factors included not utilizing stop work authority (SWA) 
when it was needed, smoking in non-designated areas, leaving workstation unattended 
when needed etc. These factors usually reflect the safety culture of the organization and 
the subsequent behavior of the agents in this organization. Blaming an individual for 
such actions will not help eliminate the cause. 
Analysis of BSEE identified human error appeared mostly related to 
organizational laggings that were not tackled on time. As Sydney Dekker mentioned: 
“Underneath every simple, obvious story about ‘human error,’ there is a deeper, more 
complex story.” [129]. 
 
4.4.3. Other significant findings 
In the analysis, it was found that the most common equipment where fire 
initiated were compressors, which related in 18% of the incidents. Pipelines and hoses 
conducting hydrocarbons appeared next in 16%, and generators and engines followed in 
15% of the incidents. Compressors and pipes usually provided the fuel source whereas 
engines and generators were the most common ignition sources, their hot surfaces 
providing energy for initiation of the fires. Energy due to hot work was the next common 




Almost 33% of the fire incidents occurred during maintenance work, suggesting 
more precautions being required during this time. 24% of all incidents involved hot 
work. Although it is understandable that performing hot work which provides high 
heat/energy in a flammable area of the facility is more prone to fires, Figure 11 indicates 
that inadequate measures usually caused these incidents. 
 
 
Figure 11: Figure showing the most common factors that appeared in incidents 
related to Hot Work. *Reprinted with permission from “In search of causes behind 
offshore incidents: Fire in offshore oil and gas facilities” by S.Z. Halim, S. 
Janardanan, T. Flechas, and M.S. Mannan, 2018. Journal of Loss Prevention in the 
Process Industries, 54, 254-265, Copyright [2018] by Elsevier.  
 
70% of all hot-work related incidents lacked proper isolation, which led to the 
fire. These incidents either involved a loss of containment of flammables or slags or 




improper JSA led to fire in 70% of cases and mostly influenced why proper barriers 
were not placed to ensure isolation. Inadequate procedure was found in 33% and 
procedural deviation were found in 30% of cases where hot-work was involved, 
indicating the influence of procedure in hot-work related fires. Many of the incidents 
involved welders deviating from the procedure determined during the JSA because the 
procedure appeared inconvenient at that time. In such cases, the proper method would 
have been to stop work and reevaluate the process. Proper guidance or supervision 
would also have prevented further progression of work when the appropriate procedure 
was being deviated from. However, almost none of the investigation reports mentioned 
how lack of such measures could have contributed to the incident. Hence, issues such as 
improper communication and improper supervision appear in smaller numbers (both 
24%) in Figure 11. The graph also reflects how failure to detect flammables had led to 
fire (27%). Use of unsuitable equipment and the fact that procedures did not include 
proper guidance to ‘smell’ for flammables contributed to this factor too. Thus, when 
there had been leaks, the undetected flammables along with the heat of hot-work led to 





Figure 12: Figure showing the different factors that appeared in conjunction with 
leaks. *Reprinted with permission from “In search of causes behind offshore 
incidents: Fire in offshore oil and gas facilities” by S.Z. Halim, S. Janardanan, T. 
Flechas, and M.S. Mannan, 2018. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries, 54, 254-265, Copyright [2018] by Elsevier.  
 
Figure 12 shows factors that appeared in conjunction with leaks found in the 
analysis. BSEE had identified leak as cause of fire in 11 of the 137 incidents. Our 
analysis found 42 such incidents. This was mostly because some incidents that involved 
leak as well as equipment failure were marked on the reports as having only equipment 
failure in section 8 of table 3a.   As can be seen, inadequate/lack of maintenance (45%) 
and degradation of material (24%) play the most influencing factors similar to the 
analysis of equipment failure. Also, in a similar fashion, procedures occur as an 





4.4.4. Limitations to the analysis 
At this point, it is essential to mention the sources of error and limitations in the final 
outcome of the analysis. The three main sources of error in the analysis can arise from 
the following [4]: 
1. Errors of Non-observation: Not all incidents reported to BSEE were investigated, 
and not all investigations were available in the BSEE website for public access. 
Only available District Investigation Reports were analyzed. Hence, the result of 
the analysis is limited only to these investigations. Even then, analysis of 137 fire 
incidents is a fairly large number. 
2. Errors of Observation:  As the reports were analyzed, it was observed that the 
quality of the reports varied from one to the other. Some reports were very 
elaborate, others were not. Also, identification of the probable and contributing 
causes for similar incidents also varied. This may have been due to investigations 
being conducted by different team with different set of minds, or due to the 
difference in their approach or may depend on the amount of information they 
had been able to gather from the operators. Hence, the analysis is only as in-
depth as BSEE’s investigation findings. 
3. Errors of Processing: In order to avoid inconsistencies that may arise in analysis 
of investigation reports by different team members, the methodology discussed in 
Section 4.3 was adapted. In the end, the analysis was limited only to the 




was obtained from the analysis is only as in depth as the investigation findings 
allowed.  
 
4.5. Summary  
It can be seen from the analysis provided in this paper that the 9 categories of 
causes identified by BSEE are quite broad and do not aid in an in-depth analysis about 
what led to an incident or where focus should be given to develop measures to prevent 
future ones from occurring. Although it is quite easy to state that an equipment failure, 
leak or a human error led to a fire, the numerous factors that contributed to equipment 
failure or led the human to err will remain unidentified and misunderstood if not 
properly analyzed. However, the investigation reports provided by BSEE, though not 
detailed enough to identify root causes, does provide an outline of common contributing 
factors that led to mishaps. These causes are rather concealed or out of sight, but surface 
over and over again. Such factors that recurred a greater number of times include: 
inadequate JSA/PHA (33%), inadequate isolation (27%), inadequate maintenance (26%), 
improper/inadequate procedure (20%), procedural deviation (20%). Others such as 
design flaw (16%), degradation of material (15%), failure to detect (12%), improper 
communication (12%), improper installation (10%) and inadequate supervision (10%) 
occurred less frequently. 
Job safety analysis:  In many cases, human (operator or supervisor) has been 
blamed for not conducting a proper JSA. However, questions as to what was lagging in 




occur over and over again) needs to be queried. The large percentage of incidents with 
inadequate JSAs raises one question: why are JSAs failing so much? Companies need to 
re-evaluate how they are doing their hazard analysis and how JSAs are being conducted 
during frontline operation to find a solution to the question. 
Procedure: Almost twenty percent of incidents had occurred due to inadequate 
procedures and an equal percentage due to deviation from an outlined one. Together, 
procedures contribute the most behind offshore incidents. In 5% of incidents, both had 
occurred, explaining that operators had deviated because they had realized the problem 
with the procedure, but had taken a wrong action to correct it. What the reports do not 
answer precisely is why operators deviated in the remaining 15% incidents. From the 
analysis of reports, in some cases it appeared that either the procedure had failed to 
mention the required action for a particular situation, or that the procedure outlined was 
simply not convenient at the time. In most cases however, the reports lack explanation 
about this. At times, it appeared that many of the operators were not well supervised, or 
the related hazards of their task were not communicated well enough. In a smaller 
number of cases of procedural deviations, sudden mistakes in operation had appeared. 
However, it should be realized that human error will occur and hence there is a need to 
design systems that are not error-prone.  Multiple barriers can help in this regard. One 
incident for example involved operator opening a wrong valve that led to a fire. There 
were other mitigative measures in place to prevent accidental release of flammables, but 




Investigation should find what caused the human to err, or why a system failed instead 
of blaming anyone.  
Inadequate isolation: This mostly occurred during hot work (62%) and in 
conjunction with inadequate hazard identification (62%) and procedure related issues 
(46%). However, in 38% of the incidents with inadequate isolation, human error has 
been identified by BSEE as the cause of fire incident.  
Inadequate/Lack of maintenance: The effect of lack of maintenance are profound 
when it comes to equipment failure and leaks. Further analysis as to why there was 
inadequate maintenance, or a backlog could not be identified. Although the investigation 
findings allowed us to find contributing factors behind the surface causes, the analysis 
team agreed that in most reports, further questions and queries would have enabled 
finding the deeper causes behind the incidents. For example, many incidents where 
degradation of material led to fire, the reports do not state why the material degraded in 
the first place. Was there a lack of inspection or maintenance, was there a use of 
improper material of construction, or something else? Many reports indicate degradation 
due to excess heat, others just state that the material developed a leak without 
recognizing the deeper cause.  
Blaming human (as an individual) for the shortcomings in maintenance, 
isolation, procedure or JSA does not solve the problem. The analysis team did not agree 
with many cases where BSEE had identified “Human Error” as the cause.  For instance, 
maintenance work remaining in backlog and thus leading to wires arcing and igniting a 




system of the organization. Also, further analysis as to why an individual failed to 
perform a task as required or why he/she deviated needs to be conducted. Most reports 
tagging human error as causes of fire showed problems with JSA, procedure, supervision 
and communication to be the leading contributing factors that affected the human 
performance. Investigations should have probed more into the matter by asking 
questions such as “what was the problem with the JSA, or procedure”, “why was there a 
problem of communication” and henceforth.  
Even with the limitations mentioned above, it is clear that causes behind offshore 
incidents mostly involve lack of proper hazard analysis, laggings in procedure, and lack 
of steps to eliminate human error. Fire incidents have deeper roots than reported and 
only proper investigations can bring forth the proper mitigative measures required.  
If an organization investigates all incidents (and near misses) and implements the 
learnings over time, then it is possible to significantly reduce future incidents and ensure 
safer operation. Capturing the learning via implementation is crucial but prior to that, a 
proper investigation to understand what went wrong must be conducted. As the study 
finds, terms such as human error, equipment failure etc. may indicate superficial causes 
for an incident, but the underlying factors need to be addressed to take adequate 
measures to prevent incidents. 
The work also shows how information from various investigations can be utilized 
to understand the safety culture or safety awareness of the industry in general. If similar 
approach is used to investigate major, minor as well as near miss incidents for a 




thus be eliminated. In that context, a proper investigation method should be developed. 
As seen mentioned before, many of the investigation reports were not detailed, and the 
analysis team felt that many questions had remained unanswered. A proper investigation 
methodology, that is easy to use, yet effective to find the root causes and a reporting 
system that will provide information for a larger scale analysis like the one presented 




5. QUANTIFICATION OF CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO DETERMINE 
GENERIC AND PLANT SPECIFIC FAILURE DATA 
 
5.1. Background  
The failure trend of a component is assessed by using the following information: 
a. the past performance data of the specific component, b. performance data of similar 
components in similar installations or, c. engineering knowledge of design and 
construction of the component [130].    
For any equipment, in the absence of information a, information b and c can be 
obtained from manufacturer specifications or from generic data (failure data of a specific 
component accumulated from various facilities and averaged) and used for failure. As 
the equipment operates, its performance data (a) can then be used to update the 
information from b and c to provide plant-specific and current data.  
Generic reliability data for offshore equipment failure are readily available in 
multiple data sources such as the OREDA database, WellMaster RMS or the PDS 
Handbook [131-133]. Data are provided with variance to incorporate the uncertainties in 
their estimation. Methodologies exist for collection of data from similar facilities to 
develop generic failure trends of equipment [97, 102].  
Although a lot of work has been published in this field, almost all such work 
encompasses only technical factors, i.e. they are concerned with equipment reliability. 
The remaining are focused on estimating human error, whereby an operator’s task 




technical factors are almost non-existent. Audits and expert opinions are used most 
frequently for incorporating the effect of organization on failure of a system. Generic 
data that reflect the frequency of occurrence of contributing factors leading to an 
incident are missing.  
In order to merge technical and non-technical factors, both need to be expressed 
in similar terms of failure tendencies. In here, we develop a method similar to equipment 
reliability to represent non-technical factors. These can be seen as components of 
organizational reliability. 
In this chapter, a frequently used method based on Hierarchical Bayesian 
inference for updating equipment failure rates (and hence failure probabilities) by 
combining generic and past performance data of equipment with current data is shown. 
Next, a methodology for quantification of failure occurrences of non-technical factors is 
provided. A method for estimation of generic data and for updating the generic data 
using plant-specific data for the non-technical factors is proposed. Assumptions for the 
methodology are also provided. 
Before discussing the mathematical formulation for determining the failure rates, 
a general background about counting processes is discussed. These processes help 







5.1.1. Homogenous Poisson Process vs. Renewal vs. Non-homogenous Poisson 
Process  
Taking the failure process as being failure points located randomly in the time 
space, the Poisson processes can be used to define the failure of a component/factor. The 
three common types of counting processes are  
- Homogenous Poisson processes (HPP) 
- Renewal processes (RP) 
- Nonhomogenous Poisson processes (NHPP) 
An HPP is a regular counting process with independent and stationary increments. A 
point process is said to have independent increments if the number of failures or events 
in mutually exclusive time intervals are independent random variables and is said to be 
stationary if the distribution of the number of events in any time interval depends only 
on the length of the time interval only and not on the distance of the interval from the 
origin  [110, 111]. The cumulative intensity function W(t) is the expected number of 
failures N(t) observed in the time interval (0, t] and its derivative is w(t), the rate of 
occurrence of failure (ROCOF). 
 For an HPP, ROCOF is a constant (λ) which is independent of time. The number of 
failures is Poisson distributed with the mean and is expressed as: 
Pr (N(t2)-N(t1) =n) = 
[[(;fg;Y]i
<! Zg[(;fg;Y for all t2 > t1 >0 
The interarrival times between failures are independent and identically 
distributed exponential random variables [110]. The arrival of the rth failure has a 








The HPP is generally applicable for systems where components are not repaired 
or where they are replaced with another one. 
In a RP the components are put into function at time t=0 and are renewed or 
repaired to ‘as good as new’ condition upon failure [110]. When the renewal period is 
identical to the life length of components, the renewal density is identical to λ and RP 
provides a generalization of the HPP. The times between failures (interarrival times) are 
independently and identically distributed. 
An HPP is generalized by assuming that the intensity of the failure process is a 
function of time. This is a NHPP where the repair reverts the system to ‘as same as old’ 
condition. The expected number of failures or the cumulative intensity function is given 
as: 
W(t)=_ M(mUm;A  
In NHPP, the failures do not require stationary increments, that is, failures are 
more likely to occur at certain times than others and the time between failures are 
generally neither independently nor identically distributed [110]. The ROCOF varies 
with time. NHPP can model ageing of a system reflecting its improvement or 
deterioration of the system through decreasing or increasing ROCOF respectively. 
Following repair, the system’s reliability is assumed to remain the same as it was right 
before it failed. For a large and complex system, if only a small part of it is replaced or 
repaired, the system’s reliability remains the same as before failure and the assumption 




likelihood function based on the fact that each failure time after the first is dependent on 
the preceding failure time [68]. 
 
5.2. Adopted mathematical formulation for estimation of failure rates of equipment  
Methodologies for estimation and updating equipment failure rates using plant-
specific data are abundant in literature and here we adopt a methodology that uses the 
Bayes theorem for reliability calculations [110, 111, 135].  
Generic failure rates of equipment are readily available, as mentioned before. It 
is important to recognize that equipment failure rates change with time due to various 
issues ranging from environmental factors to organizational factors.  For example, 
equipment used in offshore marine environment are more susceptible to failure arising 
from corrosion than those in dry non-corrosive environment. The maintenance program 
in one facility may vary significantly from that in another facility. Subsequently, the 
failure rate of a system kept under negligence due to a maintenance backlog is more 
prone to failure with time than one that is regularly maintained properly. 
Equipment/technical failures are usually modelled as following an HPP. 
Although the exponential distribution finds the widest application in equipment 
reliability (or failure probability) estimation due to its simplicity, the memoryless 
property of the distribution mean that it cannot capture the aging nature of an equipment 
[110]. Many suggest using Bayes theorem to update the failure rates by assuming the 
uncertainty to be modelled by Gamma distribution with parameters α and γ. Prior 




provide the likelihood to determine the posterior failure rates in the following way, 
adopted from Hauge[135]: 
Equation 1 n = opop∗ gop r           
   
and, 
Equation 2 s = n × op        
  
where, λ0 = prior failure rate of equipment obtained from database, and λ*0= Either of the 
three following alternatives: 
i. An analyst specifies a particular value based on his knowledge of the process 
and/or other source of data. 
ii. In case an analyst cannot make such estimate, the OREDA database is used to 
make a conservative estimate by taking λ*0 =2×λ0 since the standard deviation of 
many failure rates are found to be twice that of the mean failure rate [131]. 
iii. In either of the two estimates, the conservative estimate should not exceed 5×10-7 
failures/hour. This value has been adopted for practical reasons. 
Then, if the recorded number of failures is x over an aggregated time t in service, then 
the posterior failure rate is estimated as: 
Equation 3 ot = sTunTv         
 
5.2.1. Example problem 
Suppose an automatic fire detection system, consists of installed detectors 
throughout the operational area of a facility. According to the OREDA database, the 




Fail to function on demand = λ0= 0.97×10-6 /hr 
Suppose plant records indicate that in between inspections, it was noted that 3 
detectors had failed (x) over a period of 6 months (t). Then according to equation (1) and 




Aly f = 1030927 





The result above indicates that the having 3 detector failures every 6 months is 
worse than the industry average as indicated by the OREDA database. 
If, in between each updating, failure rates are assumed to remain constant, then 
the probability of failure of a detector with time is given by: 
Pr(Detector failure)= 1-e-λt  
Figure 13 shows how updating of failure rate causes a significant change in 
probability of failure estimation as time passes by.  
Failure rates of other equipment can be updated in a similar manner. Failure 
information of equipment can also be extracted from maintenance database, inspection 
database, audits and other sources or data historian. Thus, updating failure rates should 
not be strictly restricted only to near misses and incident, but also other databases. 
As shown in Figure 13, the probability of failure, based on plant data, could be 








Figure 13: Graph shows how updating failure rates can vary our understanding of 
the probability of failure of an equipment 
 
5.3. Proposed mathematical formulation for quantified estimation and updating of 
failure time of non-technical factors 
As a first step to merging non-technical factors with technical ones, it is essential 
to express failure of non-technical factors in reliability terms like equipment failure. In 
other words, express organizational or operational failures in terms of number of failures 




methodology similar to that mentioned for technical factor/equipment reliability. Since 
this methodology development is the novelty of this thesis, detailed explanation for the 
method is provided. 
 
5.3.1. Data format for quantifying contributing/non-technical factors 
In order to keep a dynamic aspect to risk assessment, time is a crucial factor and 
thus, failures are observed over a given time. In the analysis provided in Chapter 4, the 
date of each incident was noted along with the specification of the facility in which the 
incident occurred. A sample screenshot is shown in Figure 14.   
 
 
Figure 14: A screenshot of the spreadsheet used for analysis in Chapter 4, showing 




The dataset consisted of the exact date and time of occurrence of a fire scenario. 
Through this, the amount of time elapsed between each appearance of a particular 
contributing factor (say, procedural deviation), was available. This can be viewed in a 
manner similar to reliability calculations performed for various equipment where the 
interarrival times are known and the reliability of the equipment can be measured 
henceforth. Such information will enable us to determine the reliability of both technical 
and non-technical factors contributing to the risk of fire in an offshore facility. 
Before we proceed to quantification of non-technical factors using this data, we 
mention a few assumptions that needs to be made. 
 
5.3.2. Assumptions for quantification 
The novelty of this dissertation lies in developing a procedure for quantifying 
reliability of non-technical factors using time between failure of various contributing 
factors identified from the study of fire incident reports generated by BSEE for offshore 
facilities in the US OCS. For developing mathematical formulation for generation of 
generic data and for updating it, the following assumptions are made applicable to these 
factors: 
1. Laggings or failure of non-technical factors can exist without occurrence of an 
incident. Only at random times do these failures show-up as ‘critical’ and lead to 
an incident. The term ‘critical’ for an individual contributing factor will be used 
henceforth to refer to the particular factor’s subset of occurrence time when that 




found as a commonly occurring contributing factor behind fire incidents. This 
assumption states that procedural deviation may occur more frequently than the 
observed incidents but it does not always contribute to an incident. Only when 
procedural deviation is ‘critical’ do we get an incident (such as a fire). In this 
study, such ‘critical’ events have led to the incidents and these are termed as the 
‘failure’ of that factor.  
2. The number of failures N(t) is taken as a random variable in the time interval (0, 
t].  All failures are taken as random stochastic events. A stochastic process is 
used to define a mathematical model of a system that behaves in a random non-
predictable manner and when the number of failures N(t) is observed over a time 
interval [0,t] it is also called a counting process [110, 111]. The contributing 
factors identified in Chapter 4 can be taken as failures of those factors. 
3. The occurrence of ‘critical’ non-technical failures may vary over time. For 
example, at times of budget cut or a slump in the economy there can be a loss of 
competent workforce, inadequate training, or understaffing within an 
organization, all of which can have an influence on the overall system, and 
contribute to an incident. Number of occurrences can be more in certain times 
than in others. 
4. Organizations can be taken as repairable systems and all contributing factors or 
non-technical factors influencing an incident can be taken to be repairable. That 
is to say that any issue that leads to an incident could have been repaired prior to 




5. Once a factor has occurred/failed, the time to repair to a functioning state are 
taken as negligible. This allows us to treat the failure counting process as point 
process. This assumption is valid when repair times are short compared to 
operational time or when we are concerned only with operational times and 
repair times are modelled separately [68].  From a realistic point of view, in most 
cases companies/ organizations will continue operation following any occurrence 
of non-technical failures even if it leads to near misses or minor incidents. Only 
in rare cases will there be a major incident that will require complete shutdown 
and reorganization. Recommendations made following an incident usually takes 
some time to implement, but the organization continues its operation in the 
meantime. Changes made to organization will be reflected by changes in the 
occurrence rate of critical failures and thus will be incorporated whenever the 
model is updated.  
6. The data available to us comes from the overall US OCS, with reported fire 
incidents from various facilities. This data can be taken to represent a sample of a 
larger population of incidents and near misses that are not required to be reported 
or are not included in the study.  
7. The reliability of the contributing factors that have been developed here forth in 
this study can be taken as being generated under the same conditions. This 
assumption makes sense given that the regulatory policies and other external 




differ by conduct of operations and the operational discipline outlined by 
individual company’s policy and also by the design and operation of the facility. 
As mentioned before, ROCOF of non-technical factors are expected to vary with 
time and hence, the assumption that they follow the HPP is not applicable. A perfect 
repair assumption is also not valid for technical factors since an organization cannot 
revert to a new condition whenever there is a failure of a contributing factor. Thus, the 
RP is not applicable for such factors. 
NHPP is applicable for modeling non-technical factors because it allows modeling of 
‘same-as-old’ repair which are more applicable for organizations than a ‘good-as-new’ 
assumption. The best option would be to select a repair situation that is in between same-
as-old and ‘good-as-new’ or an imperfect repair that leaves the system in a condition 
worse than old, but such models are still not well developed and require determination of 
the extent of repair which is quite impossible to measure for non-technical factors. 
Also, as mentioned in Chapter 4, the identified contributing factors are generally not the 
root causes behind the incidents. Such factors usually have contribution from multiple 
other issues that lead to its failure. For example, procedural deviation can have 
contributions from operator’s stress level, inadequate procedure, lack of training, 
inadequate supervision and so on. Similarly, an incident also occurs by contribution of 
multiple factors. When multiple issues contribute to a failure, then the assumption of 
repair as good as old is more appropriate. Thus, the assumption of a NHPP for failure is 





5.3.3. Methodology for quantification of non-technical factors following a NHPP 
5.3.3.1. The Power Law (for modeling non-technical factors) 
The ROCOF (rate of occurrence of failure) of a NHPP (nonhomogenous Poisson 
process) has been described in literature by several parametric models [69, 110, 111] 
including the power law model, the linear model and the log-linear model. Of these, the 
statistical models for the power law model is the most developed and it can subsume 
other models such as the linear model under certain conditions [69]. For this reason, we 
use the power law model for modeling failure of non-technical factors. 







where α is the scale parameter (that sets the units with which time is measured) and β is 
the shape parameter (that determines how the ROCOF changes over time).  
For β=1, the power law reverts to an HPP. If β<1, reliability growth is occurring 
(smaller frequency of failures as time increases) and if β>1, ageing is occurring (failures 
are occurring more frequently as time increases). The time to first failure for the power 
law process follows a Weibull distribution as given by the density function:  
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It should be noted that this is applicable only for first time to failures. If data of 
interarrival times are fitted to a Weibull distribution, it would be misleading since this 
would mean that the data are from a renewal process (where a repair as-good-as-new 




The parameters α and β will have to be estimated to determine the ROCOF of a 
non-technical factor at a given t. Expert opinion can be utilized for this, but from our 
literature review, we learnt that using available data to determine the values of the 
parameters would be more precise. 
 
5.3.3.2. Bayesian Analysis (for learning from past incidents) 
We have data that is obtained from analysis of incidents [136]. We want to make 
inference about the process that produced this data. 
Two candidates, widely used for determination of α and β from data, are the 
Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE) and Bayesian analysis. The MLE method is 
widely known and straightforward to apply. A limitation for application of MLE in our 
case is that it does not work well when the number of data points is small and does not 
allow incorporation of any prior beliefs or opinions. With reliance on small number of 
incident data, MLE is likely to give results that offshoot the actual estimation by a large 
range. Epistemic uncertainty of the parameters α and β  is not incorporated in the MLE 
method [100]. 
On the contrary, Bayesian analysis can allow prior information or opinion to be 
incorporated in the estimation, allowing the small data generated from a facility to ‘fine-
tune’ this prior information to make the estimate plant-specific. Hierarchical Bayesian 
Analysis (HBA) discussed in Section 2.5 is best suited for this purpose. The prior 
information can come as evidence of failures in other facilities and its distribution is 




yet occurred in the facility of interest) can be incorporated into the model through the 
use of such prior distributions. 
HBA particularly allows evidence from other sources/facilities to be used for 
estimation of a prior which can then be used to update failure likelihood of a specific 
facility using the facility’s own data. It should also be noted that other methods (such as 
MLE) use lumped data to yield results that generate a relatively narrow posterior 
distribution. But such results are population averaged and do not adequately reflect the 
full range of uncertainty associated with source-to-source variability of the data. HBA 
can explicitly address this variability [69, 100]. 
 
5.3.3.3. WinBUGS/ OpenBUGS (for computation of Bayesian inference) 
Although the Bayesian equation is straightforward, its normalizing constant (the 
denominator) can prove to be computationally challenging [137]. Conjugate 
distributions are preferred to enable tractable analytic solutions for estimation of the 
joint posterior in continuous Bayesian networks. However, this limits the power of 
Bayesian inference only to a few known distributions. Using the power law distribution 
to model time to failure will not be possible analytically. An alternate to this is a 
developed numerical method whereby Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method is 
used for deriving complicated distributions [67]. WinBUGS and OpenBUGS are 
publicly available software that enable such calculations to be performed [138].  They 
enable stochastic sampling from given distributions and follow certain rules whereby 




calculation is performed is beyond the scope of this work, we will only provide the 
developed algorithm that were used for HBA. 
 
5.4. Generating generic data for non-technical factors 
Utilization of generic data provides a prior knowledge about population 
variability of a parameter of interest that can then be combined with case-specific data to 
determine the distribution particular to a facility. Generic data can be determined using 
HBA in which it is calculated in the first stage using data from various facilities.   
In order to generate a generic data for the non-technical factors, we turn our 
attention back to the data generated from the BSEE incident investigation report analysis 
in Chapter 4. There we obtained the dates on which a particular non-technical factor 
contributed to a fire incident. We use that data to determine the interarrival time of the 
critical failures of the non-technical factors. In the absence of data available from 
various facilities, we utilize this data which encompasses the overall US OCS.  
Measurement of failure rates are made in terms of number of failures and units of 
operation time. Data of BSEE fire incidents encompass information from all facilities in 
the US OCS and amount of operation can vary from time to time. Thus, a simple 
measurement of number of days elapsed between failures will not reflect the actual 
amount of operational time. It is essential to consider the sum of days of operation in 
each existing/working facilities within that time period in between failures. 
Following provides the steps followed for determination of the total operating 




5.4.1. Determination of operating times between failures: 
Data of offshore structures located in the US OCS were obtained from the BSEE 
Data Center [140]. This spreadsheet contained various data about the platform structures 
located in the US OCS including their installation and removal dates. As of January 19, 
2019, there is data about 7151 platform structures to ever operate in the US OCS.  
The following steps were followed to calculate the time of operation in between 
incidents: 
1. Data of the structures belonging to the same complex were eliminated, except for 
the structure with the oldest installation date in that complex. It was assumed that 
each of these remaining structures represented each facility and a separate 
organization.  
2. Since incidents observed in Chapter 4 were from 01/01/2014 up to 12/31/2016, 
platforms that were removed from operation prior to 01/01/2014 or installed after 
12/31/2016 were eliminated from the calculation of operation time. This reduced 
the number of platform structures to 3985 only.  
3. Of the remaining platforms, those that were installed prior to 01/01/2004 but 
continued operation after this date had their installation dates set to 01/01/2004. 
This was done solely for simplification of computation. Similarly, platforms 
removed after 12/31/2016 but installed before this date had their removal dates 
set to 12/31/2016. 
4. Next, a Matlab file was developed to determine the total time of operation from 




incident in which the particular non-technical factor being considered was found 
to fail critically).  
If Installation date < Incident date < Removal date,  
Time of operation of installation i= Incident date – Installation date 
If Installation date >Incident date  
Time of operation of installation i = 0 
If Incident date > Removal date 
Time of operation of installation i= 0 
Total time of operation (from 01/01/2004 up to incident date) =  
∑ F5Z K K	Z)RK/ K /R)..)RK/    
Time in between incidents =  
Total time of operation of (j+1)th incident – Total time of operation of jth incident 
 
Time of operation in between incidents for each non-technical factor were 
calculated in this manner and data for several factors are provided in Table 4.  
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Table 4: Table showing cumulative operating time (years) upto failure of different non-technical factors as identified 


































































































































1 1934 248 3128 2861 2010 1249 1951 1917 1787 812 
2 3548 1631 7083 5511 2258 1824 2598 2118 2881 1715 
3 4014 1741 7789 10358 3429 4111 2926 3239 3036 8991 
4 4363 2043 8303 11435 3641 4660 3492 4971 9927 10274 
5 6182 2208 9052 14960 4053 4669 4613 5694 10583 12745 
6 6529 3904 9060 14960 4218 5245 12809 6617 10995 13235 
7 7325 4014 12107 16046 4865 5318 12818 7146 13707 14078 
8 8357 4870 12577 16629 5385 6844 13877 9099 14249 18128 
9 11034 6182 13662 16972 9152 6971 14060 9511 14641 21133 






































































































































11 11803 6602 22472 18017 11059 8796 15865 10350 15552 21825 
12 11989 7142 23376 21545 13044 9163 18003 13647 17070 23199 
13 13066 8357 27336 21961 14035 9208 18346 14068 19948 24443 
14 14317 11034 
 
22002 14327 9727 18441 15396 19956 28459 
15 17027 11830 
 
28080 15076 10383 19391 20932 23848 28748 
16 18603 12317 
 
28780 15085 11474 20076 27060 26298 29473 
17 19718 13066 
  
16144 11920 22919 28080 26775 
 
18 23176 13075 
  
16798 12462 23376 28337 27243 
 
19 23211 14134 
  
17288 13345 23612 29719 29821 
 
20 23592 14317 
  








































































































































21 23633 15799 
  
18132 13882 26229 31091 
  
22 25585 15816 
  
18601 17062 26289 
   
23 26486 16064 
  
18601 17715 27275 
   
24 27650 16591 
  
18947 18169 28434 
   
25 30411 16591 
  
19037 18628 29454 
   
26 32031 16937 
  
19350 20474 30245 
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With the data on the total operating time between failures, we can make visual 
examination of the failure trend of the contributing factors with elapsed time. In Figures 
15 and 16, we show graphs of the number of failures against the cumulative operating 
times calculated in Table 4. Only graphs for contributing factors Procedural Deviation 
and Inadequate Supervision are shown respectively. 
 From the graphs of number of incidents against cumulative time, we see that 
failure occurs at irregular times and some failures are more cluttered in certain time 
periods than in during other periods, indicating that the failure rates are different over 
these periods and the interarrival times seem to be not independent or identically 
distributed as we had assumed for a single facility. Thus, using this data obtained from 
the US OCS and treating it as coming from a single organization is justified. 
 
 
Figure 15: The number of failures and the hazard function against cumulative 
operating time graphs for Procedural Deviation showing that the assumption of 






Figure 16: The number of failures and the hazard function against cumulative 
operating time graphs for Inadequate Supervision showing that the assumption of 
failure following a non-homogenous failure process is valid for this data 
  
5.4.2. Application of Power Law for determination of hyperparameters 







We analyze the data for a failure-truncated case where we stop our observation 
after the last failure is seen. If ti is the cumulative time until the ith failure, then the 
likelihood function can be derived using the fact that the time to first failure is Weibull 
distributed and the succeeding times to failure follow a left truncated Weibull 













The first incident is used as a starting point for the estimation of cumulative 
failure times described in the previous section. Each of the time to failure is loaded as 
‘data’ (evidence) to the likelihood function in OpenBUGS. 
We are required to specify prior distributions which will reflect our prior 
knowledge of the times to failure. Here, expert opinion can be applied which will make 
it a ‘informative’ prior. Non-informative priors are studied to develop priors that 
mathematically represent complete uncertainty: they contain little or no information 
about the parameter of interest. Using them enables a wide range of α and β values to be 
generated making the inference envelope all possible data. Such priors have little 
influence on the posterior, thus making the inference completely reliant on the data 
inserted through the likelihood function.   
One of the most widely used non-informative priors is the Jeffrey’s prior [141]. 
However, these do not work well for multi-parameter problems and hence are not 
suitable for the power law process. An alternate use is the uniform distribution whereby 
equal probability is assigned to all values of a parameter within a range. However, 
opinions state that defining the range makes the prior informative and uniform 
distribution is not invariant, thereby generating different posteriors under different 
reparameterization [102]. Utilization of diffused gamma distributions as non-informative 
priors have been proposed in multiple sources [68, 69, 102]. This work adopts diffused 
gamma distribution as non-informative priors, defining α and β as 
We utilize OpenBUGS to perform MCMC sampling to generate the joint 




similar to that proposed by Kelly et al. and Rodionov et al. [68, 69]. Since the likelihood 
function is not pre-programmed into OpenBUGS, the ‘zero-trick’ method is utilized as 
described by Rodionov et al. and Kelly et al. [68, 69].  
Because OpenBUGS can have difficulty in generating initial values from the 
priors, initial values for α and β are provided. These initial values are just estimated 
values for starting the sampling. For complicated models, two chains are run in parallel, 
starting at two different points to understand when convergence to posterior has been 
achieved [68]. If the history plots of these two chains indicate show mixing, then 
convergence has been achieved. An alternate is to use the BGR (Brooks-Gelman-Rubin) 
convergence diagnostic [68]. We will not discuss how this works since it if beyond the 
scope of our work. If the red line (representing BGR ratio) in the BGR diagnostic 
becomes 1 and if the blue line (estimate of with-in chain variance) is stable, then 
convergence is said to have been achieved. The iterations following convergence point 
are then used for the real estimation of the posterior probabilities. 
The MCMC sampling provides us with statistics of α and β. We are also 
interested in determining the next time to failure as well as the probability of failure with 
a given time interval after the last incident where a given non-technical factor failed. To 
obtain the uncertainty associated with the estimation of time to next failure, its value is 
modelled as being extracted from a gamma distribution. All known times to failure data 
are loaded into the algorithm along with an additional data entry coded as NA to signify 
that the value of this data point is not known. Initial values are given as NA for each 




entry are given as a value slightly more (+1) than the value of the last measured time to 
failure.  
 Distribution of the probability of failure are also determined from the cumulative 
distribution function and is given by 
(R = 1 − exp {−B((F + R − F} 
Where T is the cumulative time of the last failure and t is the cumulative time of the next 
predicted failure and λ=α-β [68].  
Two types of probabilities are estimated: one for failure in the US OCS in the 
next 3,6,9 and 12 months and one for a single facility in the next 6 months, 1 year, 1.5 
year and 2 years. The calculated operation times upto failures have units in years. With 
the large number of facilities operating in the US OCS, each day the sum of operating 
time was found to be equivalent to 7.73 years of operation in a single facility. It was 
calculated that, on average, the sum of three months of operation time in the US OCS 
was equivalent to an operation time of 695 years. Thus, the algorithm calculates the 
probability of failure in the next 695,1390, 2085 and 2780 years respectively to 
determine the probability distribution of failure in the US OCS bimonthly. The algorithm 
also calculated the probability of the next failure being in the next 6,12,18,24 months by 
setting t as 0.5,1,1.5,2 respectively. This would be operation time of a single faclity. The 
algorithm is provided in Appendix B. 
We next provide a sample estimation of the failure data of the non-technical 
factor “Procedural Deviation”. Only the results obtained from other non-technical factors 




5.4.2.1. Procedural Deviation: Example 
Data for likelihood function: Data is obtained from the second column of Table 4 
and entered with an additional data given as NA. This tell OpenBUGS that we do not 
know the value of this node so that we can monitor its value as the time to next failure. 
Priors: α ~ gamma (0.0001, 0.0001), β ~ gamma (0.0001, 0.0001)  
Initial values: 
Chain 1: α=1500, β=0.5, t=c (NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, 
NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, 32032) 
Chain 2: α=1500,β=1.5, t=c (NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, 
NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, 32032) 
Two chains were run simultaneously to determine if convergence has been 
achieved. The program was iterated 40000 times and the BGR statistics were observed 
for α and β as shown in Figure 17. As can been seen, convergence has been achieved 
(red line is close to 1.0 and blue line is stable). 
 
  





The program was run for another 40000 iterations (took 25 sec) to compute the 
values of the parameters. The data are shown in figure 18. 
 
 
Figure 18: Computed data showing various values of the hyperparameters α and β, 
probabilities and time to next failure for Procedural deviation 
 
Here pr.g1=probability of next failure within the next 3 calendar months, 
pr.g2=probability of next failure within the next 6 calendar months,  pr.g3=probability of 
next failure within the next 9 calendar months and, pr.g4=probability of next failure 
within the next 12 calendar months of operation  in the US OCS. pr.p1=probability of 
next failure within the next six months (0.5 years of operating time) in a single facility, 
pr.p2=probability of next failure within the next 1 year in a single facility, 
pr.p3=probability of next failure within the next 1.5 years in a single facility, 
pr.p4=probability of next failure within the next 2 years of operation in a single facility.  
OpenBUGS guidelines suggest that the value of Monte Carlo (MC) error should 




be carried out to ensure convergence. As can be seen from the values provided in the 
table, this condition is satisfied and the chains have converged. 
Values of estimates for 2.5 and 97.5 percent confidence intervals are also 
provided along with the median. 
Distribution graphs obtained are provided below in Figures 17-20. The last graph 
(Figure 20) provides the distribution of the predicted next time to failure, with the x axis 
showing the number of years of operating time in the US OCS. 
 
 
Figure 19 : Figure showing the obtained distribution of the parameters of the 






Figure 20: The probability distribution of the next critical failure of Procedural 
Deviation occurring in the US OCS within the next 3 months (pr.g1), 6 months 
(pr.g2), 9 months (pr.g3) and 12 months (pr.g4) are shown here.  
 
 
Figure 21: The probability distribution of the next critical failure of Procedural 
Deviation occurring with a single facility located in the US OCS within the next 6 
months (pr.p1), 1 year (pr.p2), 1.5 years (pr.p3) and 2 years (pr.p4) are shown here. 
Notice the shift in the mean value as time elapses, indicating an increased 





Figure 22: The probability distribution of the predicted next time to failure with 
contribution from Procedural Deviation in the US OCS 
 
For the probability distributions in Figure 20 and 21, notice the shift in the mean 
value as time elapses, indicating an increased probability of the next failure as time goes 
by. 
With the last time to failure occurring at 32031 years of operation (from Table 4), 
the next time to failure is expected to occur after 33140 years of operation, with a 
standard deviation of 1183 years of operation. This means that the next time to failure is 
1109 years after the last incident was noted in the US OCS. With an average of 2780 
years of operation time every calendar year, the next incident is expected to occur 
approximately 4.8 calendar months after the last one. 
As shown for Procedural Deviation, results obtained for some of the other non-
technical factors are also provided below. Data used for these computations were those 
given in Table 4.  BGR graphs and history was checked (graphs of convergence are not 




5.4.2.2. Design Flaw: 
 
Figure 23: Computed data showing various values of the hyperparameters α and β, 
probabilities and time to next failure for Design Flaw 
 
 
Figure 24: Distributions obtained for hyperparameters α and β, probabilities and 







5.4.2.3. Degradation of Material 
 
Figure 25: Computed data showing various values of the hyperparameters α and β, 




Figure 26: Distributions obtained for various values of the hyperparameters α and 






5.4.2.4. Inadequate/Lack of Maintenance 
 
Figure 27: Computed data showing various values of the hyperparameters α and β, 
probabilities and time to next failure for Inadequate/Lack of Maintenance 
 
 
Figure 28: Distributions obtained for various values of the hyperparameters α and 







5.4.2.5. Improper Procedure 
 
Figure 29: Computed data showing various values of the hyperparameters α and β, 
probabilities and time to next failure for Improper Procedure  
 
 
Figure 30: Distributions obtained for various values of the hyperparameters α and 







5.4.2.6. Inadequate Supervision 
 
Figure 31: Computed data showing various values of the hyperparameters α and β, 
probabilities and time to next failure for Inadequate Supervision 
 
 
Figure 32: Distributions obtained for various values of the hyperparameters α and 







Figure 33: Computed data showing various values of the hyperparameters α and β, 
probabilities and time to next failure for Inadequate Communication 
 
 
Figure 34: Distributions obtained for various values of the hyperparameters α and 







5.4.2.8. Improper Job Safety Analysis (JSA) 
 
Figure 35: Computed data showing various values of the hyperparameters α and β, 
probabilities and time to next failure for Improper JSA 
 
 
Figure 36: Distributions obtained for various values of the hyperparameters α and 







5.4.2.9. Failed to Detect 
 
Figure 37: Computed data showing various values of the hyperparameters α and β, 
probabilities and time to next failure for Failed to Detect 
 
 
Figure 38: Distributions obtained for various values of the hyperparameters α and 







5.4.2.10. Inadequate Isolation 
 
Figure 39: Computed data showing various values of the hyperparameters α and β, 
probabilities and time to next failure for Inadequate Isolation 
 
 
Figure 40: Distributions obtained for various values of the hyperparameters α and 







5.4.2.11. Contact with Hot Surface (Ignition source) 
 
Figure 41: Computed data showing various values of the hyperparameters α and β, 
probabilities and time to next failure for Contact with Hot Surface 
 
 
Figure 42: Distributions obtained for various values of the hyperparameters α and 
β, probabilities and time to next failure for Contact with Hot Surface 
 
Figures 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37,39 and 41 provides the results obtained 
from the MCMC sampling obtained using the data for various contributing factors from 




and the boundaries for the 95% confidence interval. Figures 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 
40 and 42 shows the distribution of the hyperparameters, the probabilities of failures 
based on operation time in the overall US OCS, and in a single facility. The distribution 
of the predicted time to next failure is also shown. As discussed before the probability 
distribution is seen to change over time, as the probability of failure increases as time 
elapses. 
 
5.5. Updating to Plant Specific Data 
If past plant data is available, that data can be used to determine the current 
failure probability distributions of each factor using the methodology described in the 
previous section. In the absence of such data, aggregated data from other facilities or the 
entire US OCS can be used as shown.   The parameters α and β for each non-technical 
factor describe the distribution of this generic data. As the facility keeps operating and 
new data becomes available, we will have to update the probability distributions using 
the new data. This will enable the generic data to be made plant-specific.  
The posterior parameters estimated from the generic data are fed as priors to the 
algorithm of the plant-specific data. This forms the second stage of the Hierarchical 
Bayesian analysis. That is to say that we learnt and have a general idea about the 
distribution of α and β from the data of the US OCS and we will now use that knowledge 
to modify the parameters α and β using our plant specific failure data. The algorithm 




parameters α and β estimated from the generic data. Cumulative time to failure of a 
factor in the facility is fed as evidence. 
Since we have values of α and β expressed as mean and standard deviations from 
the first stage of the HBA and we want to use these values as priors in the second stage, 
we use a truncated normal distribution. OpenBUGS provides compete dataset that 
represents the distribution of α and β but we simplify this using only the mean and 
standard deviation. OpenBUGS parameterizes the normal distribution with mean and 
precision (which is 1/variance). So, the mean and standard deviation of the posterior α 
and are converted to mean and precision and fed as priors to the plant-specific algorithm. 
The program is run in the similar manner as shown before.  
 
5.5.1. Updating Procedural Deviation: Example 
Suppose we find 3 occurrences of Procedural deviation from past plant data. 
These deviations are assumed to have occurred 200, 300 and 520 days from the last 
incident.  
The prior distributions were written as truncated normal distributions in terms of 
(mean,precision) as  
alpha ~ dnorm(1404,0.00000335)T(0,1500) 
beta ~ dnorm(1.011,24)T(0,2) 






Data were converted from days to years since the parameters α and β (priors) 
were obtained for years of operation. Thus, the data was fed as .55556,.83333, 1.4444 
(corresponding to 200, 300 and 520 days). 
As usual, iterations were initially conducted to allow for convergence. The BGR 
statistics was used to check for convergence. 
 
  
Figure 43: BGR statistics of updated hyperparameters α and β showing 
convergence  
 
This time it took 240,000 iterations to achieve convergence. We run 80000 more 
iterations to obtained the parameters. 
 
Figure 44: Computed data showing updated values of the hyperparameters α and 







Figure 45: Distributions obtained for updated values of the hyperparameters α and 
β, probabilities and time to next failure for Procedural Deviation 
 
 
From the data obtained, the next time to failure due to procedural deviation is 
expected to be (2.125×365)-520= 256 days after the last incident. We also note that as 
we make out data plant-specific, the parameter α changes drastically (from 1404 to 
1.061), bringing the scale of the distribution in alignment with that of the facility itself. 
We assumed that we observed 3 procedural incidents in only 1.44 years of operation. 
This time between failures is extremely small compared to the thousands of years of 
operation we observed in the US OCS before an incident takes place. Hence, we have 
observed these incidents occurring way more frequently than is actually noticed in 
reality. The shape factor is also changed (from 1.011 to 1.065) indicating a worn out 
system where the procedural deviation is occurring within lesser time gap than before 
(frequency of failure is increasing). Thus, the management should focus on how to 
reduce procedural deviation.  




5.5.2. Conversion to Near Miss data 
As mentioned, our assumed observed data for updating Procedural deviation was 
a little offset because we were considering 3 major fire incidents occurring in a facility 
in a short period of time (1.44 years). Here the challenge arises that fire incidents are 
quite rare in offshore facilities and hence collecting data to update non-technical factors 
so that they reflect the condition of the organization would not be possible frequently. 
Just to provide an idea about the rarity of major incidents, we find that there were 86 fire 
and explosion incidents in 2016 in the US OCS out of 1900 facilities that were in 
operation during that time. A straightforward average gives a probability of fire incidents 
as 0.045 in a facility per year (equivalent to 1 fire incident in 22 years of operation). 
Thus, it becomes very difficult to assess changes in non-technical factors and requires a 
catastrophe to understand the change (which completely defies the purpose of a risk 
assessment). It becomes essential to find sources other than incidents to update our 
estimation.  
A study of 1.75 million incidents reports from 297 organizations in 21 different 
industries found that for every major incident, there were 10 minor incidnts,30 property 
damage incidents and 600 no-loss incidents or near misses [142]. This forms the basis of 
Bird’s triangle or Heinrich’s triangle. For individual organizations or for regulators, it 
may be possible to collect data of near misses (incidents where the last barrier was 
challenged) and to conduct a complete and accurate analysis. For the purpose of this 
thesis, since we do not have the data of near misses, we assume that each major incident 




The values estimated for each non-technical factor in the previous section were 
based on only those 137 fire incidents who investigation reports were available to us. We 
have assumed that data from these available reports are sample data from a larger 
population that encompasses all fire incidents that occur in the US OCS and that BSEE 
only investigates ‘major’ fire incidents. Then, each of these incidents will have 
approximately 600 near misses and the cumulative operational time before each failure 
are averaged to be 600 times less than computed in the previous section. 
Below, the modified generic data used cumulative operation times to failures that 
lead to near-misses are provided for an example with Procedural Deviation. 
 
5.5.2.1. Procedural Deviation with near miss data: Example 
Data for near miss incident was obtained by diving the cumulative time to major 
incidents by 600 using Heinrich’s major accident to near miss ratio. For convenience, the 
time was then converted to days from years.  
 
Table 5: Assumed near miss data obtained for Procedural Deviation by taking 
ration of near miss to major incident as 600. 
Incident number from the first 
incident noted after 01/01/2004 
Cumulative time for procedural deviation 







Table 5: Continued 
Incident number from the first 
incident noted after 01/01/2004 
Cumulative time for procedural deviation 























Table 5: Continued 
Incident number from the first 
incident noted after 01/01/2004 
Cumulative time for procedural deviation 







As before, the BGR statistics was checked and it was observed that using 40000 
iterations for convergence was sufficient, as shown in Figure 46.  
  
Figure 46: BGR statistics of hyperparameters α and β for near miss data showing 
convergence  
 







Figure 47: Computed data showing values of the hyperparameters α and β, 
probabilities and time to next failure using near miss data for Procedural Deviation 
 
 
Figure 48: Distributions obtained for hyperparameters α and β, probabilities and 
time to next failure using near miss data for Procedural Deviation 
 
As can be seen in Figure 48, the shapes of the curves remain the same but the 
values have altered. Probability of failure leading to a near miss within the next 1 year 
(given by pr.p2) has a mean of 0.3833 whereas it was 0.2566 before when we were 
considering only the chances of a major incident where procedural deviation would be a 
contributor. This is in alignment with our assumptions that non-technical failures like 
that of procedural deviation occur frequently and although not all lead to major 
incidents, the probability value estimated is that of near miss where barriers have failed. 
Thus, using probability of non-technical failures from near miss data gives us more 




Results for other non-technical factors leading to near misses are provided next. 
5.5.2.2. Design Flaw (leading to near miss) 
 
Figure 49: Computed data showing values of the hyperparameters α and β, 
probabilities and time to next failure using near miss data for Design Flaw 
 
 
Figure 50: Distributions obtained for hyperparameters α and β, probabilities and 
time to next failure using near miss data for Design Flaw 
 
5.5.2.3. Degradation of Material (leading to near miss) 
 
Figure 51: Computed data showing values of the hyperparameters α and β, 







Figure 52: Distributions obtained for hyperparameters α and β, probabilities and 
time to next failure using near miss data for Degradation of Material 
 
5.5.2.4. Inadequate/Lack of Maintenance (leading to near miss) 
 
Figure 53: Computed data showing values of the hyperparameters α and β, 








Figure 54: Distributions obtained for hyperparameters α and β, probabilities and 
time to next failure using near miss data for Inadequate/Lack of Maintenance 
 
5.5.2.5. Improper Procedure (leading to near miss) 
 
Figure 55: Computed data showing values of the hyperparameters α and β, 
probabilities and time to next failure using near miss data for Improper Procedure 
 
 
Figure 56: Distributions obtained for hyperparameters α and β, probabilities and 






5.5.2.6. Inadequate Supervision (leading to near miss) 
 
Figure 57: Computed data showing values of the hyperparameters α and β, 




Figure 58: Distributions obtained for hyperparameters α and β, probabilities and 












5.5.2.7. Inadequate Communication (leading to near miss) 
 
Figure 59: Computed data showing values of the hyperparameters α and β, 




Figure 60: Distributions obtained for hyperparameters α and β, probabilities and 
time to next failure using near miss data for Inadequate Communication 
 
5.5.2.8. Improper JSA (leading to near miss) 
 
Figure 61: Computed data showing values of the hyperparameters α and β, 






Figure 62: Distributions obtained for hyperparameters α and β, probabilities and 
time to next failure using near miss data for Improper JSA 
 
5.5.2.9. Failed to Detect (leading to near miss) 
 
Figure 63: Computed data showing values of the hyperparameters α and β, 
probabilities and time to next failure using near miss data for Failed to Detect 
 
 
Figure 64: Distributions obtained for hyperparameters α and β, probabilities and 





5.5.2.10. Inadequate Isolation (leading to near miss) 
 
Figure 65: Computed data showing values of the hyperparameters α and β, 
probabilities and time to next failure using near miss data for Inadequate Isolation 
 
 
Figure 66: Distributions obtained for hyperparameters α and β, probabilities and 
time to next failure using near miss data for Inadequate Isolation 
5.5.2.11. Contact with Hot Surface (Ignition source) (leading to near miss) 
 
Figure 67: Computed data showing values of the hyperparameters α and β, 







Figure 68: Distributions obtained for hyperparameters α and β, probabilities and 
time to next failure using near miss data for Contact with Hot Surface 
 
Figures 49, 51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 65 and 67 provides the results obtained 
from the MCMC sampling obtained using the data for various contributing factors from 
Table 5. They show the various parameters such as mean, standard deviation, median 
and the boundaries for the 95% confidence interval. Figures 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 
64, 66 and 68 shows the distribution of the hyperparameters and the probabilities of 
failures based on near miss data for a facility. The distribution of the predicted time to 
next failure is also shown.  
 
5.5.3. Updating Near Miss data with Plant-Specific data 
The values (mean and standard deviation) of α and β obtained as posterior in the 
generic data are now used as prior for updating with evidence specific to the plant. We 
apply same methodology we showed before in Section 5.5.1, except that we use the 
posteriors we obtained from using near miss data in days. Near misses are to be 





5.5.3.1. Updating non-technical factor (Procedural Deviation) using generic near 
miss data: Example 
Like before, we assume that we observed Procedural Deviation in investigated 
near-misses and/or incidents in the following cumulative times since the last failure: 200, 
300 and 520 days.  
The posterior values of (mean, standard deviation) of α and β were (880.8,546.2) 
and (1.011,.2012) respectively. The standard deviations were converted to precision. 
 
Input:  
alpha ~ dnorm(880,0.000003352)T(10,1000) 




Convergence was achieved within 40000 iterations. A further 40000 iterations 







Figure 69: Updated data showing new values of the hyperparameters α and β, 





Figure 70: Distributions showing new values of the hyperparameters α and β, 
probabilities and time to next failure for 3 plant incidents where Procedural 
deviation occurred 
 
Time to next failure was predicted to be 759-520=239 days after the last recorded 
near-miss/incident. Compared to Figure 47, this is lesser than the generic time to failure 
which was 20190-19486= 704 days. This is in accordance with what the value of β 




frequently. A decrease in the time to next failure is due to this. Based on procedural 
deviation, this organization’s performance is worse than the industry average. 
 
5.6. Summary 
This chapter provides methodologies for generation of generic data for non-
technical factors and for subsequent updating of the data to make it plant specific.  
An interesting find in this section is that in the development of generic data, since total 
operation time in the entire US OCS is considered, it gives a good estimate about the 
overall performance of the facilities over time in this region. Since the total number of 
facilities vary with time, year by year, so does the total operation time. Because number 
of incidents have been expressed in terms of number of calendar years, it has always 
been a challenge to understand the trend of incidents. The total operation time, in 
contrast to calendar time, provides a normalization based on the amount of operation 
conducted in this region and thus provides a better understanding of whether any 
particular non-technical factor has an increasing or a decreasing trend. The trend can be 
understood from the value of β.  
- If β<1, the factor is seeing ‘reliability growth’, meaning that time between 
failures are growing with time, indicating better performance.  
- If β>1, it indicates a worn-out or an ‘ageing’ system, meaning that the 
performance had gotten worse with time and failures are being more frequent with 




From the analysis of the data, we see that factors Design flaw and Improper JSA 
are the only two factors for which β<1. This indicates that with time, flaws in design has 
reduced and that identification of hazards in job safety analysis have gotten better. As for 
the other factors, measures need to be taken to identify how to improve them.  
The mean values of β obtained from the data can thus indicate which factors are 
leading to more fire incident in the US OCS and which factors have improved over time, 
giving the regulatory body an indication of where to focus their efforts. 
BSEE conducts a large number of incident investigations every year. Proper data 
collection from these investigations can allow generation of precise generic data for non-
technical factors. Facilities can make use of it and update their data to have a better 
understanding of their own system. Operating companies themselves can develop 
methods to investigate near misses to identify failure of the non-technical factors and 
assess their own risks. Several companies can join hands to share their experience and 
data to develop their own generic data that each company can update and have precise 








In order to predict the risk of fire in a facility, it is important to understand the 
condition or failure probability of each individual factor and also to determine their 
interdependency to understand how their individual failures interact with each other. 
One of the greatest challenges of incorporating non-technical factors into risk assessment 
models is to establish how these factors are to be brought together for computation of 
risk. Some may be influenced by a common cause; some factors may have a stronger 
influence on causing system failures than others and so on. Traditional fault trees only 
consider linear interaction of the failures but where non-technical factors are involved in 
a complex system, their interaction may well be non-linear [143]. 
In this chapter we establish a method by which the learning from past incident 
analysis is utilized to determine how multiple factors interacted with each other that led 
to a fire incident. For this we consider all possible combinations of the factors, and 
determine weightage of each combination by counting the number of incidents that 








6.2. Determining weightage of each combination of factors 
Fire incidents analyzed in Chapter 4 varied from each other in the combination of 
the different contributing factors that led to the incident. Some combinations were more 
common than others. All possible combinations of contributing factors and a relative 
probability of their occurrence to each other can be determined from the analysis 
conducted. This relative probability, or weightage provides a comparison of the 
importance of each combination in a risk assessment. As shown in Figure 14, for each 
incident analyzed, we had marked occurrence of contributing factors as 1 and its absence 
as 0 (making their occurrences Boolean). In the end, we could sum up to get the number 
of occurrences of each combination. This, divided by the total number of incidents 
studied gives us the weightage of each combination.  
Thus, if A and B are the only two contributing factors considered, weightage is 
given by  
w(A=a, B=b) =
1$O89 % <&8<;> 898 ,: :<& ,O
;%;:0 <1$O89 % <&8<;>  
where a and b are Boolean (can be either 1 or 0). For n number of non-technical factors, 
we can have 2n combinations (since their occurrences are Boolean). 
For our case study to be developed in the next chapter, we will consider only a 
few of the contributing factors for simplicity. As shown in Chapter 4, multiple factors 
occur in conjunction with equipment failure. We consider only the top three factors, 
which are Inadequate/Lack of Maintenance, Degradation of Material and Design flaw. 
With 3 contributing factors, we get 23= 8 combinations. We ignore those incidents where 




appear are taken to be zero. We note that there were in total 69 incidents where 
Equipment failure was found, out of which 44 had one or more of the three non-
technical factors considered. Among these 44 incidents, the counts of the various 
combinations are provided in Table 6 with the respective computed weights.  
 
Table 6: Counts and weights for various combinations of three non-technical 








1 1 1 1 2 0.045 
2 1 0 1 2 0.045 
3 1 1 0 8 0.182 
4 1 0 0 16 0.364 
5 0 1 1 2 0.045 
6 0 0 1 9 0.205 
7 0 1 0 5 0.114 
8 0 0 0 0 0.000 
Total 
   
44 1.000 
 
From the analysis in Chapter 4, it was also noted that in a large portion of the 
incidents, non-routine tasks led to fire incidents. Risk assessment models should 




For the case study, we will consider Procedural deviation, Inadequate/Improper 
Procedure, Inadequate supervision and Improper job safety analysis (JSA) as the 
contributing factors only. The factors Procedural deviation and Inadequate/Improper 
procedure are combined together as Procedure related for sake of simplicity. The 
weights of these factors in the 137 fire incidents are provided below in Table 7. We 
ignore those incidents where none of the considered factors occurred (others did) for 
simplification. 
 
Table 7: Counts and weights for various combinations of four non-technical factors 














1 1 1 1 1 1 0.018 
2 1 1 1 0 1 0.018 
3 1 1 0 1 4 0.070 
4 1 1 0 0 15 0.263 
5 1 0 1 1 0 0.000 
6 1 0 1 0 5 0.088 
7 1 0 0 1 2 0.035 
8 1 0 0 0 10 0.175 



















10 0 1 1 0 2 0.035 
11 0 1 0 1 1 0.018 
12 0 1 0 0 12 0.211 
13 0 0 1 1 0 0.000 
14 0 0 1 0 0 0.000 
15 0 0 0 1 1 0.018 
16 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 
Total 
    
57 1 
 
Hot work operations provided a significant ignition source that led to a large 
number of incidents. Other non-technical factors were seen to contribute to this. The top 
three factors were Inadequate Isolations, Improper JSA and Procedural Deviation. We 
determined the weights of the various combinations of these factors where hot work was 








Table 8: Counts and weights for various combinations of three non-technical 










1 1 1 1 3 0.094 
2 1 1 0 13 0.406 
3 1 0 1 1 0.031 
4 1 0 0 6 0.188 
5 0 1 1 4 0.125 
6 0 1 0 3 0.094 
7 0 0 1 2 0.063 
8 0 0 0 0 0.000 
Total 




The various ways contributing factors can interact with each other and lead to an 
incident have been addressed in this chapter. The weights represent the non-linear 
interaction that can arise from such interaction. 
Certain combinations have 0 weight, meaning they did not appear in any incident 
observed.  For non-routine operations, we found 26 incidents where none of the factors 
considered contributed. For equipment failure, there were 25. If we were to consider 




The combinations and corresponding weights obtained can now be used to merge all 




7. DEVELOPMENT OF BARRIER ANALYSIS MODEL TO ASSESS 
CUMULATIVE RISK  
 
7.1. Background 
We have determined the individual probabilities of failure of non-technical factors 
(Chapter 5) and determined the way they depend on or combine with each other to lead 
to an incident (Chapter 6). We now use this information to merge all factors to assess the 
cumulative risk of barrier failure.  
AND-gates and OR-gates a for continuous probability distributions are computed using 
the equations shown in Table 9 [144]. 
Table 9: Table showing equations for calculating probabilities of factors connected 
by AND-gate and OR-gate. 
AND-gate PN = PN1-1·PN2-1·…PNi-1 
OR-gate PN = 1- (1- PN1-1) ·(1-PN2-1) ·…(1- PNi-1) 
(Approximated as PN = PN1-1+PN2-1+…PNi-1) 
 
where N1, N2…Ni are the parent nodes of the child node N.  
The factors present in any particular combination are to be combined as -AND 
gate (their probabilities are multiplied) as shown: 
PANDj=P1.P2…Pi          (1) 
where i is the number of factors contributing in the combination j. This gives the 




Each combination is then merged with another through an -OR gate with 
weightage of each combination. The weightage gives an estimate of the averaged 
probability that a particular combination may cause the incident: 
PSystem Failure= 1 − ∏ [1 − D(G
 ]      (2) 
where i is the number of combinations, and ω is the weight of combination j.  
An approximation of Equation (2) is given as 
PSystem Failure~ ∑ [D(G]        (3) 
The utilization of weights is similar to that proposed in the BORA model, except 
that in that case, the weights were determined by experts and the probabilities were 
replaced by the score of the risk influencing factors (RIFs) which were also obtained 
from aggregated expert opinion [11, 90]. 
An -OR gate and the -AND gate can be modelled in OpenBUGS, but using the 
free Bayesian Network software GeNIE proved much simpler [66] .   
An analysis of barrier failure probabilities would require development of a 
method to assess all conditions that lead to failure of each barrier and how failure of 
individual barrier then leads to a consequence. For this purpose, an example of a release 
scenario from an offshore separator has been adopted from literature and the details are 








7.2. Case Study 
An offshore oil/gas separator is considered for the case study. Failure of the 
separator can cause release of hydrocarbons, which, if not detected, can find an ignition 
source and lead to fire. For simplicity, only three barriers are considered:  
- Release Prevention Barrier: Its failure causes loss of containment for the 
flammables from the separator 
- Detection Barrier: This enables early detection of the loss of containment/release 
of hydrocarbon, and 
- Ignition Prevention barrier: This ensures no ignition source is present when the 
loss of containment occurs so that the released flammables may not ignite. 
 An event tree was developed with each fault tree connected to its pivotal points. The 
consequences for the failure of each barrier were categorized according to severity. 
 
7.2.1. Release Prevention Barrier: 
In an offshore production platform, gas from wellhead manifold are processed in 
two identical separators to separate out the condensate before being passed through a gas 
compressor manifold [110]. One of the separators are shown in Figure 71. Pressure 
buildup within the separator can cause the separator to rupture, releasing hazardous 
flammable gases onto the platform. Valves are installed to prevent such a situation and 






Figure 71: A simplified schematic diagram of an offshore oil-gas separator (Figure 
adopted from Rausand, M. and H. Arnljot, System reliability theory: models, 
statistical methods, and applications. Vol. 396. 2004: John Wiley & Sons) 
 
As shown in the Figure 71, the gas inlet pipe coming from the wellhead has two 
process shutdown valves PSD1 and PSD2 installed in series. These valves are held open 
by hydrostatic pressure and are designed to fail close in case of emergency.  Another 




valve, PSV is installed to relieve any excess pressure buildup within the separator and is 
designed to open if this pressure goes beyond a set point p.  
Due to the fail close design of the PSDs, they may close spuriously. If PSD3 fails 
close spuriously, this may lead to a rapid rise in pressure within the separator. Pressure 
switches, PS1 and PS2 are installed to independently monitor the pressure within the 
separator and in case the pressure rises to p1, which is less than p, the switches will send 
a signal to the Programmable Logic Controller, PLC, which uses as 1-out-of-2 voting 
logic to close the valves PSD1 and PSD2. Hazard may also increase if the PSD1 and 
PSD2 fails to close on command. If all control system fails and the pressure in the 
separator exceed p, the PSV may activate to relieve off the pressure. If the PSV fails, 
then the separator is subject to overpressure and may rupture and release flammable 
gases.  
Apart from the inherent failure tendency of the individual components, failure 
probabilities are also influenced by the extent of maintenance conducted. There can be a 
lack of maintenance, or the maintenance work done may have not been completed 
properly. At the same time, degradation of material also influences the failure 
probabilities of the equipment or its connections. There have been many incidents where 
design flaw has led to early failure of a component and thus a release was noted. These 
factors are taken to directly influence the failure probabilities of the components along 
with their inherent failure tendency. Weights give an idea of the extent to which each 




As a further modification to the hazard analysis, it is noted that release of 
hydrocarbons from the separator may not occur solely due to overpressure, but may also 
be caused by a structural failure or due to mistakes made during non-routine operations 
such as maintenance. The fault tree shown in Figure 72 provides a graphical 
representation of this. Structural failure may arise due to degradation of the wall arising 
from say, corrosion. It may also occur due to impact that may lead to a sudden release. 
In our analysis of incidents, such causes of structural failure were not seen and will not 
be considered in our risk assessment (hence they have been drawn in a lighter shade).  
We only consider failure from non-routine operations such as maintenance work, 
including hot work because they were frequently found to lead to hydrocarbon releases. 
Determination of the weights of combinations in Chapter 6 provided a background for 
understanding which factors were more likely to cause failure and hence were 
incorporated in the fault tree. 
Connection to the non-technical factors are shown with gray-dotted lines to 











7.2.2. Detection Barrier: 
A detection system is likely to be available on an offshore gas production 
platform to detect any unwanted release of flammable gases before it ignites. The fault 
tree for an offshore gas detection system is shown below in Figure 73 along with the 
non-technical factors. Inadequate maintenance of detectors, improper placement etc. 
contributed to their failure. During non-routine operations, it was found that operators 
failed to detect the release of hydrocarbons. That too was considered in this barrier.  
 
 








7.2.3. Ignition Prevention Barrier: 
Several common ignition sources were identified from the investigation report 
analysis. These included heat sources from hot work, heated equipment surface, static 
electricity, lightening and electric arcs due to equipment malfunction. Only the hot work 
and the heated surface sources are considered in the failure of the ignition barrier. As 
shown in Figure 74, inadequate isolation along with inadequate JSA and procedural 
deviation play a crucial role in this barrier’s success. 
 
 








7.2.4. Event Tree: 
In the event tree, each pivotal point is taken as a barrier as shown in Figure 75. 
Initiating event frequencies are not required since we are monitoring only the barriers 
health conditions (the top event of each fault tree), but if it can be assigned, then the 
event tree will allow determination of the probabilities of each consequence which are 
defined next. When all three barriers fail, it is termed a catastrophe. In case only one 
barrier is safe, and the remaining fails, it is termed a near miss (near-miss can be defined 
as ‘only one barrier did not fail and was challenged’). In case only one barrier failed and 
the others functioned, it is termed an event. If all the barrier is functioning, then it is a 
safe operation.  
 
Figure 75: Event tree for separator 
  
7.2.5. Mapping fault trees and event trees into Bayesian Network 
The fault trees and event trees developed in the previous sections were combined 









For the non-technical factors, values of ‘pr.p2’ were taken for near miss data of 
each factor. This value was taken since it corresponded to failure probability at the end 
of next year. Nodes for non-technical factors were modelled in GeNIE with truncated 
normal distributions.  
Data for equipment failure rates were taken from the OREDA Database 
Handbook [131]. Failure rates were converted to failure probabilities with time set to 1 
year.  
Pr(A)=1 − Zg[; 
Thus, we were able to obtain the distribution of the failure probability of an 
equipment component using the mean and thee standard deviation provided. 
 
Table 10: Mean and standard deviation of probability of failure of various 
equipment described in the Case Study  
Mean probability of 
failure in the next 1 year 
Standard deviation of the 
probability of failure in the 
next 1 year 
PSD Valve (PSD1) 2.275E-01 1.867E-01 
PS System (PS1) 2.926E-02 2.286E-02 
PSV 1.901E-02 2.365E-02 
PLC 4.073E-02 2.137E-02 





Equipment failure probabilities were modeled in GeNIE with truncated normal 
distributions also. 
Equations (1) and (2) were used to determine the failure probabilities of the child 
nodes where non-technical factors were the parent nodes. These child nodes were PDS1, 
PSD2, PSD3, PS1, PS2, PLC, PSV, Detector, Non-routine Operations, and Hot Work 
nodes.  
For non-technical factors influencing failure of equipment, equations were 
written using the weights given in Table 6. For example, the equation for the node of 




Here D, M and DG represent the nodes Design Flaw, Inadequate/Lack of Maintenance 
and Degradation of Material respectively.  
System failure arising from the contributing non-technical factors are added 
using respective weights to the generic failure data of the equipment. This is done 
because the equipment can fail due to its inherent properties or due to contributions from 
non-technical factors. Thus, their probabilities are added. 
Using weights from Table 7, the node for Release from Non-routine Operation 







Here, P, J, S, C refers to Procedure Related, Improper JSA, Inadequate Supervision, 
Inadequate Communication respectively. The node Procedure Related is an OR-gate that 
brings together the nodes Procedural Deviation and Improper Procedure. 
The equation for node Hot Work was written using Table 8 in a similar manner: 
Hotwork=(0.09375*I*J*P)+(0.406*I*J)+(0.03125*I*P)+(0.1875*I)+(0.125*J*P)+(0.09
375*J+0.0625*P) 
The purpose of the work is to analyze each of the barriers. We also add a 
consequence node to determine the probability of an incident occurring when all barriers 
fail. This is given by and AND-gate: 
Consequence=RPB*DB*IB 
where RPB, DB and IB refers to the release prevention barrier, the detection barrier and 
the ignition barrier respectively.  
Once the Bayesian Network was developed it was run to generate results. 
7.2.5.1. Result of Case Study 
The resulting probability distributions of each node is shown in Figure 77. Closer 
view of the probability distribution and parameter information of each barrier and the 





Figure 77: Results obtained by running the Bayesian Network in GeNIE gave 











Figure 78: a. Probability density function (PDF) and b. Cumulative density 
function (CDF) of the Release Prevention Barrier. The mean, standard deviation 
and the minimum and maximum values obtained are also provided. 
 







Figure 79: a. Probability density function (PDF) and b. Cumulative density 
function (CDF) of the Hydrocarbon Detection Barrier. The mean, standard 











Figure 80: a. Probability density function (PDF) and b. Cumulative density 
function (CDF) of the Ignition Prevention Barrier. The mean, standard deviation 









Figure 81: a. Probability density function (PDF) and b. Cumulative density 
function (CDF) of the Consequences node. The mean, standard deviation and the 





7.2.5.2. Updating case study with plant specific data 
We assume that we observe 5 near misses/incidents over a period of 2 years in a 
facility and we investigate and analyze the incidents to find contributions from non-
technical factors as those shown in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Assumed data for incidents and their analysis results showing occurrence 














1 200 1   
2 300 1  1 
3 450   1 
4 520 1 1  
5 680  1 1 
 
Equipment failure probabilities may also be updated by taking data from 
maintenance and inspection databases which can provide information about the number 
of times the equipment had failed. The data can be used to update the reliability 
information of the equipment and compute the failure probability. For simplification we 




Updating the Procedural deviation was shown in Chapter 5 and repeated in 
Figures 82 and 83. Improper JSA and Inadequate/Lack of maintenance are updated in 
the same way and the results are shown in Figures 84-87. 
7.2.5.2.1. Procedural Deviation (updated)  
 
Figure 82: Updated data showing new values of the hyperparameters α and β, 




Figure 83: Distributions showing new values of the hyperparameters α and β, 









7.2.5.2.2. Improper JSA 
 
Figure 84: Updated data showing new values of the hyperparameters α and β, 




Figure 85: Distributions showing new values of the hyperparameters α and β, 











7.2.5.2.3. Inadequate/Lack of Maintenance 
 
Figure 86: Updated data showing new values of the hyperparameters α and β, 
probabilities and time to next failure for 3 plant incidents where Inadequate/Lack 
of maintenance occurred 
 
 
Figure 87: Distributions showing new values of the hyperparameters α and β, 
probabilities and time to next failure for 3 plant incidents where Inadequate/Lack 
of maintenance occurred 
 
As before, the mean and standard deviation of ‘pr.p2’ is inserted into the GeNIE 
model to provide an updated information about the barrier conditions and the overall 






7.2.5.3. Results after updating data with new information 
 
Figure 88: Updated Bayesian Network, made plant specific with data about failure 












Figure 89: Updated a. PDF and b. CDF of Release Prevention Barrier with mean 
and standard deviation of the probability of failure 
 







Figure 90: Updated a. PDF and b. CDF of Hydrocarbon Detection Barrier with 












Figure 91: Updated a. PDF and b. CDF of Ignition Prevention Barrier with mean 
and standard deviation of the probability of failure 
 







Figure 92: Updated a. PDF and b. CDF of Consequence node with mean and 







From Figures 88-92, we get the distribution and the parameters of the barriers 
and the consequence nodes that were updated with plant data. We note that there is an 
increase in the mean or an increase in the trend of failure probability. This indicates that 
the facility in consideration has a performance that is worse than the industry average, 
i.e. the US OCS. 
If desired, values of pr.p1, pr.p3 and pr.p4 can also be used to determine the 
probabilities at various time periods. The graph in Figure 93 shows how the probability 
increases as time elapses for the consequence node, depicting an increasing chance of 
fire as time elapses. Also, if the updated probabilities are higher, then the probability of a 
fire also increases. 
 
 
Figure 93: Graph showing how the probability of the consequence node changes 
over calendar time (months). The generic failure probability is shown with a X and 




7.2.6. Financial Analysis using estimated cumulative risk 
The cumulative risk estimated so far only looks at the probabilistic part. Risk is 
the product of the frequency (probability in a given time) of an incident and its 
consequence. Hence, we need to consider the impact a fire incident may have given that 
all its barriers fail. Consequence modelling is beyond the scope of this work. But we can 
provide a probabilistic consequence from the analysis of the BSEE incident investigation 
reports.  
As shown in Table 3a, BSEE incident investigation reports provided records of 
the estimated financial damage that was caused by the outbreak of fire. We clustered the 
collected data of financial loss into 4 categories as shown in Table 12 and counted the 
number of incidents in each cluster. As expected, the number of incidents increases with 
decrease of the consequence. These are however not exact values since these do not 
include financial losses incurred due to compensation provided due to any fatality or 
injury. They were mostly covered in Panel Investigations which have not been included 
in this study. The Macondo disaster is also not included in this list. However, the method 
suggested here provides an outline of how financial losses can be predicted when 
sufficient and proper data is made available. 
 On the right most column of Table 12, the number of incidents in each cluster 
has been normalized with the total count of 137 incidents. This gives an average chance 






Table 12: Table showing the count of incidents in different categories of disaster 
based on the amount of financial loss incurred due to the incident 







Catastrophe >1 Billion 1 0.7 
Disaster 1 Million- 1 Billion 5 3.6 
Major Incident 100,001-999,999 28 20.4 
Minor Incident 0-100,000 103 75.2 
 Total 137 100 
 
 As we found before (Section 7.2.5.1.4), the probability of a fire (consequence 
node) at the end of 1 year was 0.0476. And, if there is a fire outbreak, the probability 
that it will be a catastrophe (>$1 billion damage) is 0.0476×0.007= 0.00033. Then, the 
risk of a catastrophe (more than $1 billion damage) is estimated to be greater than 
0.00033*$1 billion=$333,200. Thus, the company should be willing to spend more than 
this amount of money per facility annually to overcome the chances of a catastrophe. 










Figure 94 summarizes the flow path followed in the current research. 
 
Figure 94: The various flow paths followed during the research to arrive at the goal 




We began with establishing a definition for cumulative risk assessment as 
achieving an updated information about the dynamic risk through merging of technical, 
operational, human and organizational deviations existing within a facility using data 
that is specific to that facility and current in time. The definition was established based 
on literature review, discussion with industry experts and in-house support and identified 
several key challenges associated with merging of technical, operational, human and 
organizational factors with their dynamicity, inter-dependencies and uncertainties. 
A further and more extensive literature review was conducted to understand how all the 
challenges of cumulative risk assessment can be met and the pros and cons of various 
past efforts were studied. The review found that a standalone model for cumulative risk 
that met all the requisites was still missing and that the current practices do not 
extensively incorporate human and organizational factors into the risk assessment due to 
the difficulty of measuring and merging them with technical factors. It was concluded 
that development of a data-centric approach would allow overcoming the limitations of 
expert opinion used for merging various factors and would also make the model more 
dynamic. 
 In the first step, a methodology was developed to analyze 137 incident 
investigation reports prepared by BSEE from 2004 to 2016 to identify causes behind fire 
incidents in the US OCS.  This methodology provided a statistical representation of 
contributing factors that led to the incidents. This new methodology shows how incident 
investigation reports can be harnessed for statistical data about non-technical factors 




and human error have been generally taken as reasons behind incidents in the 
investigation report, the deeper study revealed contribution from organizational 
deviations as deeper causes.  
Results showed that inadequate maintenance, degradation of material and design 
flaw were the leading contributors that occurred in conjunction with equipment failure, 
improper JSA, procedural deviation and improper procedure contributed most with 
human error and inadequate isolation, improper JSA and improper procedure occurred 
most in hot work incidents. These findings formed the basis of development of the 
Inverted Pyramid Concept and the subsequent CRA Framework from which the next 
steps were then defined. The statistical data obtained in this step allowed it to be used for 
quantification in the next step. 
In the second step, it was proposed that reliability assessment methods could be 
utilized to quantify the contributing factors using the generic dataset obtained in the first 
step. This allowed expressing non-technical factors in terms equivalent to the technical 
factors. Since the number of facilities in the offshore region change over time, a 
normalizing method was shown whereby the total operation time in a given calendar 
time between failures was calculated. Results showed that the rate of occurrence of non-
technical failure were non-constant and a non-homogenous Poisson process should be 
used for modeling such failures. The Power Law process was used in Hierarchical 
Bayesian analysis whereby the generic dataset was used as evidence to generate 
probability distributions for failure trend of contributing factors.  11 contributing factors 




‘design flaw’ and ‘inadequate/improper JSA’ have been decreasing over time although 
for the other 9 factors, deterioration was observed. Also, the time to next occurrence was 
also computed. For example, it was predicted that the next time of occurrence of an 
incident due to a procedural deviation was 1109 years of total operating time in the US 
OCS after the last observed incident. Due to the rarity of occurrence of major incidents, 
the concept of Heinrich’s Pyramid was used to convert the incident dataset to that of 
near-misses and computation of an updated probability using mock data about 
contributing factors from a particular facility was shown. Results showing changes in the 
probability of failure indicated how changes within a dynamic facility can be captured 
over time. When there is lack of data, generic data can be used for assessment and the 
failure probabilities and the next time to failure of non-technical factors can be 
estimated. 
Once the probability of failure of the individual factors were determined and 
updated, the next step involved proposing a method of merging them. This was done 
through counting of the number of times each combination of multiple factors was 
observed. This step thus developed a data-centric method of learning relationships 
among various contributors, reducing the need to depend solely on expert opinion.   
In the last step, all the information computed in the previous steps were brought 
in together for the case of an offshore hydrocarbon separator. Three barrier fault trees 
(release prevention, detection and ignition prevention) constituting of both system 
instruments and contributing factors were mapped onto Bayesian network.  Probability 




study considering several observed near miss incidents in a facility was used to show 
how the generic data estimated could be updated to show the changes in the barrier 
health conditions over time.  This model merged technical, operational, human and 
organizational factors together and could be updated in time as plant data became 
available. It contained information from past incident records as well as current 
condition, thus giving a holistic look at risk. 
The novelty of this research lies in the development of a framework which enables a 
complex system to be broken down and assessed in simple steps to enable a better 
understanding of the dynamicity of the contributing factors on the overall risk. In the 
process, the following novel methods were developed:  
- Identifying contributing factors and harnessing their data from investigation 
reports 
- Quantifying contributing factors and assessing their reliability dynamically 
- Estimating dependencies of contributing factors through learning from past 
incidents 
- Merging contributing factors and updating understanding of the risk along with 
the uncertainty associated with its estimation 
While conducting this research, certain limitations were realized, some as arising 
from the assumptions made while some were due to the quality of the information used. 





- In the analysis of incident investigation reports, we observed that our work was 
limited by non-observation, since not all incidents were reported, and by observation, 
since the analysis was based only on what was reported. Added to these were limitations 
in our analysis. Although we had developed a methodology for analysis of investigation 
reports, there was still some subjectivity involved in the analysis. With better 
investigation and reporting process, this might be reduced, but where there will be non-
technical factors involved, a certain degree of subjectivity can be expected. 
-  There is a lot of scope for improvement in investigation methods and subsequent 
reporting. Some incident reports were found to be very detailed while others were the 
opposite. An in-depth and consistent investigation method will enable better 
identification of root causes. However, an in-depth investigation requires time and 
resources, which sets another limitation. 
- Since investigation of near misses will allow generation of more data, attempts 
should be taken in the future to develop a quick investigation method to identify the 
causes behind then. This however, would again require a quick investigation and 
reporting methodology. 
- Attempt can be made to either develop a taxonomy for reporting or to develop 
natural language processing methods to analyze investigation reports so that machine 
learning from incidents becomes possible. 
- We provided justification for assuming non-technical factors as following a non-
homogenous Poisson process for failure. This was based on the reasoning that their 




large amount of data is available for successive failure incidents, then the validity of this 
assumption can be checked. 
- All cumulative operating times were counted from the first incident date on 
record (after 1/1/2004). During this time, it was assumed that all facilities were in similar 
operating conditions, which most likely may not be true. This limitation can be 
overcome in the future if data of all incidents from the installation date of the respective 
facilities are available. 
- The analysis did not categorize incidents in terms of severity of the 
consequences. In the future, new reports can be analyzed with categorization in mind. 
- Regulators and operators need to work together for better results in assessing 
cumulative risk. All incidents should be reported and investigation and analyzed. This 
will help operators in terms of obtaining generic data and understanding of how to merge 
factors through use of weights. Thus, by reporting incidents, they will in return be able 
to assess barrier conditions better. Only then will the feedback loop of the inverted 
pyramid be complete. 
- This research provides a ground for development of a dashboard model whereby 
all contributors to risk can be viewed in current time and the effect of altering the 
probability of occurrence of a contributor can be better understood. Such model will 
allow management to visually understand how to optimize their resources among the 
highest contributors so that the risk of barrier failure can be brought down to ALARP. 
- This approach can be extended to other area of practice such as pipeline where 




In conclusion, the methodology developed in this research tackled all the identified 
challenges associated with cumulative risk assessment. Because the contributors to risk 
are precisely understood, the risk can now be controlled better. When applied, this 
method will enable management to optimize resource allocation in a manner that 
provides the greatest return while keeping risks to a minimal.  A data-centered model has 
been developed that reduces the reliance on expert opinion and makes the risk 
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DEFINITION OF CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AS USED IN THE INCIDENT 
INVESTIGATION REPORT ANALYSIS [136] 
For each incident, the following questions were asked. Terms for which the answers 
came ‘yes’ were noted as a factor for the incident. 
 Term Definition of term as used in analysis 
1. Equipment Failure Did the incident initiate due to failure of a particular 
equipment? 
2. Human error Did the incident occur due to a 




Did the incident occur due to any large impact (such as 
between helicopter and rig/platform) from outside? Note 
that this is different from point 4 which refers to impact 
within a platform 
4. Impact/dropped 
object 
Did the incident occur because there was an impact 
between two objects inside the rig/platform? (See point 3 
also) 
5. Weather related/ 
natural cause 
Did the incident involve a natural calamity (e.g. storm) 




 Term Definition of term as used in analysis 
7. Incomplete/improper 
JSA or PHA 
Was the Job Safety Analysis (JSA) or Process Hazard 
Analysis (PHA) missing or inadequate? Did the 
JSA/PHA fail to identify all the hazards?  
8. Permit to work Was there a problem with the permit to work? Was the 
permit to work missing? 
9. MOC related Was there a missing MOC (Management of Change)? 
Was the MOC wrong? 
10. Inadequate/lack of 
maintenance 
Was there negligence in the maintenance? Was the 
maintenance in backlog? Was the maintenance done in a 
way that later led to the incident? 
11. Improper inspection Was there a failure to find the flaw during an inspection? 
Was inspection not done when needed? 
12. Improper installation Did improper installation (e.g. a missing gasket at a 




Was the method of task completion not clearly defined or 
not defined at all through documentation? Was there a 




 Term Definition of term as used in analysis 
14. Procedural 
Deviation 
Did a person deviate in action from the procedure or from 
steps outlined in the Job Safety Analysis (JSA) ? (This 
includes both deliberate and non-deliberate actions) 
15. Inadequate isolation Was there a missing physical barrier, or were there 
improper measures/lack of measures taken to isolate a 
system in case of a loss of containment? 
16. Design flaw 
 
Did the incident initiate because there was a design flaw 




Was the equipment/tool being used for the task not the 
right one to fulfil the function? Was the equipment/tool 
expected to function beyond its design criteria/range?  
18. Improper 
material/parts 
Did the equipment involved in the incident have a wrong 
material of construction or a wrong part inserted? 
19. Failure due to excess 
vibration 
Did the incident occur due to a failure that resulted from 
excessive vibration?   
20. Corrosion Did the incident arise due to a corrosion problem? 
21. Degradation of 
material 
Did the incident occur due to degradation of a material 




 Term Definition of term as used in analysis 
abrasion, heat or too much stress applied to a material 
that caused it to fail)? 
22. Contamination Did the incident involve any contamination or addition of 
impurities? 
23. Failed to detect Did the incident occur because of occurrences that went 
undetected or unnoticed? 
24. Failed to respond on 
time 
Did a human/equipment fail to carry out an action on 




Was there a missing information between any two entities 




Was the supervisor giving wrong instructions, no 
instructions, absent before the incident occurred?  
27. Inadequate control Did the incident occur because the system/task could not 
be controlled properly? 
28. Inadequate/no 
training 
Was appropriate training given to the operator at the 
correct time? 
29. Improper storage 
and handling 
Was something stored in a manner it was not supposed to 




 Term Definition of term as used in analysis 
30. Improper Mud 
Weight 
Did improper mud weight in the column lead to loss of 
containment that caused the incident? 




(Related to drilling): Did the incident occur because of 
improper cementing inside the well? 
33. *Unsuitable PPE Was any person injured in the incident wearing a wrong 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), or not wearing a 
PPE at all? 
34. *Slip/Trip/Fall Did someone slip, trip or fall during the incident? 
35. *Flawed emergency 
preparedness 
Was the emergency response flawed? 
36. *Overboard Drilling 
Fluid 
(Related to pollution incidents) Was any drilling fluid 
spilled overboard? 
37. *Lack of equipment Did the incident propagate due to lack of equipment (such 
as fire detectors, extinguishers)? 
38. Other Are there any other factor that has not been considered in 
this questionnaire? 
* These factors were on consequences of the fire incident analyzed and hence were not 






OPENBUGS ALGORITHM TO DETERMINE POSTERIOR PARAMETERS, 
FAILURE PROBABILITY IN GIVEN TIMES AND TIME TO NEXT FAILURE 
 
model { 
for(i in 1:N) { 
zeros[i] <- 0 
zeros[i] ~ dpois(phi[i]) 
#phi[i] = -log(likelihood) 
} 
#Power-law model (failure-truncated) 
phi[1] <- -log(beta) + beta*log(alpha) - (beta-1)*log(t[1]) + pow(t[1]/alpha, beta) 
t[N] ~ dgamma(0.0001, 0.0001)I(t[N-1],) #Monitor node t[N] for time to next failure 
for(j in 2:N) { 




lambda <- pow(alpha, -beta) 
t.GOM1 <- 695 #Average years of operation in 3 calendar months in US OCS 




pr.g1 <- 1 - exp(-lambda*(pow(t.window1, beta) - pow(t[N], beta))) #Mean will give 
probability of failure in the next 0.25 real year in GOM 
t.GOM2 <- 1390 #Average years of operation in 6 calendar months in US OCS 
t.window2 <- t[N] + t.GOM2 
pr.g2<- 1 - exp(-lambda*(pow(t.window2, beta) - pow(t[N], beta))) #Mean will give 
probability of failure in the next 0.5 real year in GOM 
t.GOM3 <- 2085 #Average years of operation in 9 calendar months in US OCS 
t.window3 <- t[N] + t.GOM3 
pr.g3 <- 1 - exp(-lambda*(pow(t.window3, beta) - pow(t[N], beta))) #Mean will give 
probability of failure in the next 0.75 real year in GOM 
t.GOM4<- 2780 #Average years of operation in 12 calendar months in US OCS 
t.window4 <- t[N] + t.GOM4 
pr.g4 <- 1 - exp(-lambda*(pow(t.window4, beta) - pow(t[N], beta)))  
 
t.p1<- .5 # 6 months of plant operation 
t.w1<- t[N] + t.p1 
pr.p1<- 1 - exp(-lambda*(pow(t.w1, beta) - pow(t[N], beta)))   
t.p2<- 1 # 1yr of plant operation 
t.w2<- t[N] + t.p2 
pr.p2<- 1 - exp(-lambda*(pow(t.w2, beta) - pow(t[N], beta)))  
t.p3<- 1.5 # 1.5 yr of plant operation 




pr.p3<- 1 - exp(-lambda*(pow(t.w3, beta) - pow(t[N], beta)))  
t.p4<- 2 #2 yrs of plant operation 
t.w4<- t[N] + t.p4 
pr.p4<- 1 - exp(-lambda*(pow(t.w4, beta) - pow(t[N], beta)))  
 
alpha ~ dgamma(0.0001, 0.0001) #Prior 
beta ~ dgamma(0.0001, 0.0001) #Prior 
}  
 
 
